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Abstract 
The use of collateral is one of the defining characteristics of loan contracts. This paper 
investigates if relationship lending and market concentration allow for informational rent 
extraction through collateral. We use equity IPO data as informational shocks that erode rent-
seeking opportunities. Using a new loan-level database for China, we find that collateral 
incidence increases with relationship intensity and banking market concentration for loans 
obtained pre- IPO, while this effect is more moderate post-IPO. We also show that the degree 
of rent extraction declines for lower-risk firms post-IPO, while it increases for higher-risk firms. 
These results are not driven by differences or changes in firm-specific financial risks. To our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the determinants of collateral for China using 
loan-level data. 
Keywords: Informational rents, collateral, relationship lending, market structure, IPOs, 
China. 
JEL Classification: G21, L11. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
El uso de colateral es una de las características definitorias de los contratos de préstamos. En este 
trabajo se investiga si la intensidad de la relación entre bancos y prestatarios y la concentración 
del mercado de los préstamos permiten la extracción de rentas de información a través de 
colateral. Utilizamos datos de OPV como shocks informativos que erosionan las oportunidades de 
búsqueda de rentas. Utilizando una nueva base de datos de préstamos individuales de China, 
demostramos que la incidencia del colateral aumenta con la intensidad de la relación entre bancos 
y prestatarios y la concentración del mercado bancario en los préstamos obtenidos antes de la 
salida a bolsa, mientras que este efecto es moderado después de la salida a bolsa. También 
demostramos que el grado de extracción de rentas para las empresas de menor riesgo disminuye 
después de la salida a bolsa, mientras que aumenta para las empresas de mayor riesgo. Estos 
resultados no son debidos a diferencias o cambios en los riesgos financieros específicos de las 
empresas. Hasta donde sabemos, nuestro trabajo es el primero en investigar los determinantes 
del colateral en China usando datos de préstamos individuales. 
Palabras clave: rentas de información, colateral, crédito basado en relaciones, estructura del 
mercado, OPV, China. 
Códigos JEL: G21, L11. 
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1 Introduction 
Collateral is one of the defining characteristics of loan contracts and is widely imposed in bank 
lending markets across the globe (Jiménez et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006; Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). The results of the Survey of Terms of Business Lending published by the 
Federal Reserve in April 2016 showed that 67.8% of all commercial and industrial loans (weighted 
by loan amounts) made by commercial banks in the US was collateralized, significantly higher 
than the 39.6% recorded 10 years earlier.1 Collateral requirements are even more widespread in 
developing economies: the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey covering 43 developing countries 
indicated that on average 73% of loans from financial institutions required collateral (Nguyen and 
Qian, 2012).  
Given the prominent role of collateral in debt contracts and credit markets, it is not 
surprising that collateral has become the central focus of a rapidly expanding body of research.2  
The literature on collateral suggests that credit market-related informational asymmetries may 
explain why collateral is used in debt contracts. According to this so-called commitment view, 
collateral mitigates financial frictions arising from moral hazard and adverse selection (Liberti and 
Sturgess, 2014). Banks accumulate proprietary information about borrowers through lending 
relationships, which creates informational asymmetries between “inside” banks that are already 
lending to a firm and “outside” banks that currently are not (Santos and Winton, 2008). Besides 
relationship lending, recent theoretical studies have highlighted that concentrated bank market 
structures also facilitate the existence of information asymmetries among lenders (e.g. 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001). In the context of these asymmetries, lenders often 
demand collateral because it mitigates ex-post borrower moral hazard problems: collateral 
disciplines the borrower and aligns its interests with those of the bank (e.g. Chan and Thakor, 
1987; Boot et al., 1991; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Berger et al., 2011; 
Cerqueiro et al., 2015). Collateral also is a signaling device regarding the credit quality of the 
borrower that mitigates adverse selection problems (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Berger et al., 2011). In other words, when borrowers’ credit quality is unknown, high-quality 
borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral than low-quality borrowers, as by signaling their 
quality through collateral, the former may secure a lower interest rate on their loans (Jiménez et 
al., 2006). In addition to these explanations related to information asymmetries, collateral may be 
required in debt contracts as it minimizes expected loan losses given a borrower’s default (Berger 
and Udell, 1990). Hence, this so-called hedging view proposes that, independent of borrower 
type and agency risk, pledging collateral provides a hedge against expected default risk (Liberti 
and Sturgess, 2014). These features imply that collateral is valuable to banks not only should 
debtors default, but in all stages of the lending process.3 
                                                                          
1. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/current/. 
2. The literature on collateral covers many different interpretations and theories. Macro-finance investigations highlight the 
existence of several collateral channels that operate through the effects of fluctuations in collateral values on firms’ own debt 
capacity, other firms’ debt financing costs, investment and employment (Gan, 2007; Benmelech and Bergman, 2011; 
Chaney et al., 2012; Adelino et al., 2015). Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) present a theory of asset pricing with a collateral 
channel, in which leverage cycles can cause flights to collateral. Changes in collateral values may affect aggregate output 
and drive business cycles, through their impact on credit conditions and borrowing (or collateral) constraints (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001; Iacoviello, 2005; Andrés et al., 2013; Miao et 
al., 2015). Liberti and Mian (2010) link collateral to the macro financial structure and show that collateral requirements are 
less severe in more financially developed economies. 
3. The value of collateral depends on various factors. Research has been focusing increasingly on the legal and institutional 
frameworks that protect the enforcement of collateral and creditors’ rights; hence, changes in laws governing the seizure 
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Given the value of collateral for lenders, a natural question is whether loan 
collateralization may be explained, at least partly, by informational rent extraction. This depends 
crucially on the existence of informational asymmetries between inside and outside lenders 
(Schenone, 2010). Informational advantages linked to relationship lending may be used to “hold 
up” borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Kysucky and Norden, 2015).4 Firms will face a cost 
of borrowing from inside banks that is higher than that from outside banks, due to adverse 
selection. Empirical validations of this informational rent extraction in the relationship lending 
literature mainly focus on lending rates (see e.g. Hale and Santos, 2009; Schenone, 2010), while 
rent extraction operating through non-price terms, such as collateral requirements, has been left 
largely unexplored.  
Besides relationship lending, also the structure of bank lending markets may affect the 
asymmetric distribution of firm-specific information among inside and outside lenders and hence 
may facilitate rent extraction as well. We discuss briefly a sequence of theoretical advances that 
relate market structure to the distribution of information among lenders, which in turn interacts 
with banks’ strategic behavior in determining lending policies and conditions (e.g. Dell’Ariccia, 
2001; Marquez, 2002; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).5 First, 
information extraction is likely to be less effective in markets composed of many small banks 
compared to those with only a few large banks (Marquez, 2002). Concentrated markets also 
allow for better protection of proprietary information from spilling-over to competitors, as banks 
with larger market shares have higher incentives and capacity to maintain this informational 
advantage. Therefore, concentrated lending markets not only consolidate market shares, but 
also proprietary information about borrowers. Second, different market structures, which are 
associated with different implied levels of competition, may also affect the incentive of banks to 
accumulate information. Increased competition reduces the rents banks can extract, hence 
decreases the incentives to generate information through credit evaluation (Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006). More outside borrowing options for firms in less concentrated markets also 
inhibit the (re)usability of information and diminishes its value, as firms can switch banks easily; 
therefore, banks are incentivized to invest less in information production (Boot and Thakor, 2010; 
Chan et al., 1986; Berlin and Mester, 1999).6 Third, because of limited outside options, firms are 
likely to borrow more often from the same lender in concentrated markets, which allows these 
banks to accumulate more private information. Lastly, consolidation of proprietary information in 
concentrated markets further deters the entry of new banks, as new entrant banks face larger 
adverse selection problems. Thus, information consolidation further increases the degree of 
market concentration and reinforces the information monopoly of incumbent banks (Dell’Ariccia 
et al., 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001). To sum up, these arguments suggest that concentrated markets 
                                                                          
and liquidation of collateral may affect importantly the design of loan contracts, asset liquidation values and bank lending 
behavior (Haselmann et al., 2010; Vig, 2013; Berkowitz et al., 2015; Cerqueiro et al., 2015; Calomiris et al., 2016).  
4. In contrast, inside banks may use their informational monopoly to better evaluate firms in ex-ante screening and ex-post 
monitoring (Boot and Thakor, 1994). This “information accumulation” view of relationship lending suggests that, as a result, 
borrowers may obtain better conditions, such as a lower lending rate or less stringent collateral requirements. Hence, 
relationship intensity is negatively correlated with collateral incidence, as they are substitutes for dealing with information 
opaqueness. Many empirical studies support this hypothesis (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Jimenez et al., 2006; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Bharath et al., 2011). 
5. We restrict ourselves to theories that relate bank market structure mainly to information asymmetries among inside and 
outside lenders. Other theories link market structure to collateral incidence through other channels. Manove et al. (2001) 
propose a “lazy bank” model in which banks choose between screening the borrower or ask for collateral. These authors 
argue that intensified competition favors bank laziness by reducing screening and requesting more collateral. Hainz et al. 
(2013) suggest that bank competition makes screening more effective. Hence, collateral, or an alternative to screening, is 
less required in more competitive markets. Inderst and Muller (2007) develop an inside lenders’ based model of collateral 
which does not assume the existence of information asymmetries on the borrower’s side. These authors predict that the 
incidence of collateral is higher in more competitive markets. 
6. If increased competition makes differentiation from outside banks more important, inside banks should acquire information 
more intensely (Boot and Thakor, 2000 and 2010). 
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allow for a more efficient extraction of private information and provide stronger incentives to 
obtain it; offer better protection of this information from spilling over to competitors (outside 
banks); and deter the entry of competitors which self-reinforces information monopolies. A 
straightforward implication is that concentrated markets may also facilitate informational rent 
extraction. The role of concentrated market structures in extracting informational rents, however, 
receives very little attention in the empirical literature. 
In this paper, we intend to fill the gap by examining if inside information, obtained 
through both relationship lending and concentrated market structures, allows banks to extract 
informational rents through collateral. That is, more intense lending relationships and more 
concentrated markets are associated with a higher probability of collateral incidence. We use a 
unique data set of loan-specific information including data on collateral for a large group of 
Chinese banks. 
One of the main difficulties here is to isolate informational rent extraction from alternative 
theories that predict the same outcome. In terms of relationship lending, at least three theories 
other than informational rent extraction also predict a positive association of relationship lending 
with collateral incidence. Longhofer and Santos (2000) suggest that pledging collateral improves 
the seniority of the bank’s debt claims, which incentivizes the bank to engage in ongoing, long-
term lending relationships. Borrowers benefit from this, because bank seniority induces 
relationship lenders to provide support to distressed borrowers, as the senior debtors gain the 
most from a turn-around of the firm.7 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) highlight another potential 
cost of relationship lending which hinges on the observation that relationship lenders have the 
incentive to extend further credit when borrowers are in financial distress in the hope of 
recovering loans granted previously. Anticipating the ex-post realization of this “soft budget 
constraint”, the borrower is not sufficiently incentivized to make an effort ex-ante to prevent such 
an adverse outcome ex-post. Collateral is therefore more likely to be requested when bank-firm 
relationships intensify in order to solve this constraint (Boot, 2000). Both theories suggest that 
when borrower risk increases, relationship lenders are more likely to request collateral either 
because the likelihood of a future rescue increases or the soft budget constraint intensifies. 
Lastly, Menkhoff et al. (2006) suggest banks may extend relationship length (intensity) to minimize 
the per unit fixed costs associated with the evaluation and monitoring of collateral (“cost 
minimization incentive”), which de facto produces a positive correlation between collateral and 
relationship duration (intensity). In terms of market structure, the positive association of market 
concentration with collateral may also be explained by bank market power, i.e. banks can exploit 
their sheer market power in concentrated markets by imposing more stringent collateral 
requirements (Hainz, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002). 
Informational rent extraction depends crucially on information asymmetries existing 
among inside and outside lenders, while this precondition is not conducive to the core argument 
in the alternative theories. This observation leads to an intuitive identification strategy: if inside 
banks extract informational rents through collateral, their ability to do so should be moderated 
after some exogenous shock that reduces information asymmetries existing between inside and 
outside banks. If this moderated effect is not validated empirically, one can reject the 
informational rent hypothesis and attribute the higher incidence of collateral of loans granted by 
inside banks to competing interpretations. To this end, we follow Schenone (2010) and introduce 
                                                                          
7. See Elsas and Krahen (2000) for further discussion and empirical testing of this argument. Their results indicate that 
“house” banks require more collateral as compensation for their active involvement in the restructuring of distressed 
borrowers.   
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the equity IPO of borrowing firms as such an information-releasing shock.8 In the course of the 
public offering and after being listed, previously privately-held information about the firm will be 
released through compulsory listing requirements and subsequent regular financial reporting, 
public auditing, financial analysts’ research and movements in its stock price. As this new 
information is made public to all banks, the informational monopoly position of inside banks is 
eroded and the adverse selection problem facing outside banks is alleviated, leading to a lesser 
likelihood of rent extraction for loans granted after the IPO than for loans granted before the IPO. 
One crucial part of the methodology is to control for shifts in firm risk around the time of the IPO 
or for differences in risk between listed and non-listed firms, so that changes in collateral 
incidence before and after the IPO can be attributed to changes in information asymmetries and 
are not caused by differences in firm risk before and after the IPO. We control for this by 
incorporating firm risk characteristics from both before and after the IPO, and conduct additional 
robustness tests. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to apply equity IPOs as the 
identification strategy to test if banks charge informational rents through collateral.  
Unlike most studies on informational rent extraction which focus on advanced 
economies, we concentrate on China, which is an ideal testing ground for our purpose, for 
several reasons. First, collateral is particularly important in markets where banks lack sufficient 
tools or expertise to price credit risk, or are inhibited to do so due to price regulations. This has 
been the case in Chinese bank lending markets for many years. An additional incentive to request 
collateral in these markets is to reduce the personal risks faced by loan officers, as the “loan 
officer responsibility system” introduced in 2002 holds individual loan officers accountable for 
bad loans (Qian et al., 2015). Second, Chinese banking has been characterized by strict interest 
rate controls, which only very recently have been lifted completely. This suggests that banks have 
had less discretion in setting prices compared to their counterparts in advanced economies, 
making rent extraction through collateral an attractive alternative. Third, the protection of creditor 
rights in China was strengthened after the approval of the Property Law of the People’s Republic 
of China in 2006 (Berkowitz et al., 2015), which increased the value of collateral. As our sample 
starts in 2007, informational rent extraction though collateral may have become more valuable 
since then, given the enhanced credit rights protection embedded in the new law. Fourth, bank 
lending markets in China are relatively segmented and offer significant variation across regions 
and time. This feature allows us to test if collateral requirements vary with the information 
configurations embedded in regional bank market structures. Finally, the particular features of 
equity IPO regulations and procedures in China make IPOs a valid choice as an exogenous 
informational shock for Chinese credit markets. Firms might expect to go public at some point, 
but the exact timing of an IPO depends on the approval by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (hereafter the CSRC), which is unpredictable and exogenous to both banks and 
firms, suggesting that adjustments of loan contract terms prior to an IPO are hardly economically 
viable. We manually collect information on loans obtained by firms listed at the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, both before and after their listing. These firms are generally large and information 
about them is more symmetrically distributed among lenders. Focusing on this sample will bias 
against finding informational rent extraction, as one would expect that the “hold up” problem is 
particularly pronounced for smaller firms. Hence, our sample composition should be a safeguard 
against obtaining results biased by firm size.9 To test our hypotheses, we use a unique hand-
                                                                          
8. A similar approach has been followed by Santos and Winton (2008) and Hale and Santos (2009) using corporate bond 
IPOs as informational equalization shocks. These papers together with Schenone (2010) investigate informational rent 
extraction through lending rates.  
9. Berger et al. (2011) point out that testing informational rents related to relationship lending by using a sample of small 
firms could bias the results towards a positive coefficient for the relationship lending variable, because small and opaque 
firms are precisely the ones required to pledge collateral (according to “observed-risk” hypothesis), and banks tend to use 
relationship lending to deal with these informational opaque firms. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
collected loan level dataset containing data on around 9,000 loans granted by a differentiated 
group of Chinese banks to 649 listed non-financial firms. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, all else equal, both high 
relationship intensity and concentrated market structures are associated with higher incidence 
of collateral, and these effects are less pronounced for transparent firms. We further find that 
there exists a boundary transparency level beyond which informational rent extraction becomes 
infeasible.  
Second, when applying equity IPOs as an informational shock, we find for pre-IPO 
originated loans that the likelihood of collateralization is increasing with relationship intensity, 
while this effect is greatly moderated for post-IPO loans. In some specifications, relationship 
intensity is no longer significant in predicting collateral incidence for loans originated after the 
IPO. In contrast to Schenone (2010), which shows for a US sample that the lending spread is 
decreasing with relationship intensity once the borrower is listed, we do not find a similar pattern 
for collateral. The relatively low degree of competitiveness of the Chinese banking sector relative 
to that in the United States might explain this result.10  
Third, the likelihood of collateral incidence increases with the degree of market 
concentration both before and after the equity IPO, but the effect is moderated for post-IPO 
loans. This finding supports the hypothesis that concentrated markets facilitate information 
asymmetries among lenders and hence are associated with a higher likelihood of rent extraction 
through collateral. Unlike relationship intensity, the impact of market structure on collateral 
remains significantly positive and economically large for post-IPO loans. This lends some support 
to the idea that pure market power stemming from concentrated market structures may allow 
banks to charge rents, regardless of the level of information asymmetries existing among banks 
(Hainz, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002).   
Fourth, using a novel measure of firm risk – whether a firm’s first IPO application was 
rejected by the CSRC or not – we find that once information about firm risk is made public after 
the IPO, rent extraction through collateral is moderated for safe firms but intensified for risky 
firms. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction of Rajan (1992) that informed banks are 
more able to extract rents from risky firms than from safer ones. Our finding further complements 
Hale and Santos (2009) who report similar results for lending rates.   
Finally, we find that more risky firms are more likely to pledge collateral, a result 
consistent with the “observed-risk” hypothesis (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1994). 
Furthermore, our evidence shows that private firms are much more likely to pledge collateral 
when compared to state-owned firms, adding to previous findings that private firms in China are 
charged with higher lending rates in a state-dominant banking system (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen 
et al., 2005). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate collateral incidence in 
Chinese bank lending markets with loan-level data.11  
                                                                          
10. If the relationship lender is facing limited competition (for instance due to restrictions on business scope, geographical 
restrictions on branch expansion and funding limitations for potential competitors), this bank will not share rents (surpluses) 
with borrowers or soften its lending standards relative to transaction based lenders simply because its informational 
advantage is diminished after its IPO.  
11. Very few studies have investigated the determinants of collateral in China. Notable exceptions include Firth et al. (2012) 
and Chen et al. (2013). However, none of these studies investigates the determinants of collateral at the loan-level and pays 
attention to the importance of relationship lending and market structure for the incidence of collateral, as well as how changes 
in information asymmetries among lenders may affect these linkages. 
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Overall, our findings are largely consistent with the informational rent extraction 
hypothesis, but with two important caveats. First, our results may be explained by alternative 
theories. Second, the potential endogeneity of key variables could bias our results.  
Regarding the first caveat, we contrast the informational rent hypothesis with three 
alternative explanations. First, both the “bank seniority” and “soft-budget constraint” theories 
suggest that relationship lenders require less collateral for financially healthier firms. If listed firms 
are financially sounder than non-listed firms and our analysis has not fully controlled for this 
difference, the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO loans 
could also be explained by these theories. We apply three tests to address this concern. As a 
first step, we investigate if listed firms are financially healthier than non-listed ones by comparing 
observed risk proxies. We do not find supporting evidence both in our sample and from previous 
studies investigating this issue. Then, to address potential selection bias caused by observables, 
we employ propensity score matching to generate a matched sample of loans that are “identical” 
in every aspect, expect for the borrower’s listing status. We re-estimate the baseline model for 
this matched sample and find that the results do not change materially. Finally, we address 
unobserved risk differences by using a recursive bivariate Probit model with instrumental 
variables, which we discuss below.  
The second alternative explanation is related to selection effects based on differences in 
firms’ credit quality. Suppose “relationship dependent” listed firms that obtained loans were on 
average safer than “relationship dependent” non-listed firms, while “relationship non-dependent” 
listed firms which received loans were on average riskier than “relationship non-dependent” non-
listed firms. This selection effect could explain the moderated effect of relationship lending on 
collateral incidence that we find for post-IPO loans. To investigate the relevance of this effect, we 
perform difference-in-difference tests for observed risk proxies broken down by whether a firm 
is relationship dependent and whether the loan is borrowed after the equity IPO. We do not find 
any evidence to support this explanation. As a further robustness test, we use propensity score 
matching to identify matching firms that differ only in their relationship dependencies within both 
pre- and post-IPO loan samples, and compare the average treatment effects of relationship 
dependencies on collateral between these two samples. In this way, we can discard of the 
alternative explanation that some unobserved shifts in firm-risk or heterogeneous dynamics of 
risk shifting due to the equity IPO drive our results, because we compare matching firms within 
both pre- and post-IPO samples. We find for the pre-IPO sample that relationship dependent 
firms are on average 10-12% more likely to pledge collateral than non-dependent firms, while no 
such difference exists for the post-IPO sample (Internet Appendix A).   
The third alternative explanation that we explore is that banks exchange better loan 
conditions (i.e. a lower likelihood of required collateral) for corporate bond underwriting 
business.12 This behavior potentially also may explain the moderated effect of relationship lending 
on collateral incidence that we find for post-IPO loans, given that most firms have their bond IPO 
after their equity IPO and that relationship lenders generally are involved extensively in the bond 
                                                                          
12. If firms issued for the first time in public corporate bond markets (e.g. bond IPO) prior to their equity IPO, the latter may 
not serve as the sole significant event of information equalization, as corporate bond IPOs also require extensive information 
disclosure. This issue is not a major concern in our sample, because only three firms issued corporate bonds before their 
equity IPO, which does not affect our choice of equity IPOs as the main information disclosure event. Another issue is that 
commercial banks may promise favorable loan contract terms in exchange for underwriting a firm’s equity IPO, which can 
lead to alternative explanations of our results (see discussion in Schenone, 2010). This concern is alleviated for China, 
because equity IPOs are strictly underwritten by security firms instead of commercial banks. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
IPOs of their borrowers. To isolate this alternative explanation, we re-estimate the baseline model 
on samples of loans that were originated before the bond IPOs. Also here, our results hold. 
Our previous framework relies on the important assumption that the equity IPO and 
relationship lending variables are exogenous. In reality, both could be endogenous due to omitted 
variables, therefore generating biased estimations. For instance, there could be uncontrolled 
variables that improve a firm’s likelihood to obtain a listing and at the same time reduce the 
likelihood of its loans being secured by collateral. Therefore, the moderated effect of relationship 
lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO loans could be the result of unobserved higher credit 
quality of listed firms instead of reduced information asymmetries. A similar endogeneity problem 
applies to relationship lending. Firms of lower credit quality, which is unobserved to the 
econometrician but known to all banks, may be more likely to borrow from relationship lenders 
while at the same time being subjected to more stringent collateral requirements. Hence, the 
higher likelihood of collateral required for relationship loans might simply reflect a firm’s 
unobserved poor credit quality instead of an informational “hold up” problem. To address these 
concerns, we employ recursive bivariate Probit models to test if the listing status and relationship 
dependency are endogenous and if our results change after controlling for the endogeneity of 
the respective variables. In both cases, we find appropriate instrumental variables, so that the 
identification does not rely solely on the non-linearity of the functional form. In doing so, we derive 
novel instrumental variables for the IPOs from exogenous policy shocks such as the CSRC IPO 
suspensions. Our main results also hold after controlling for the endogeneity of both IPOs and 
relationship lending.  
In addition, we perform several tests to investigate if our results are robust to the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects; the possible endogeneity of other loan contract terms (by both 
removing these variables and estimating IV Probit models); and to alternative samples. In a set 
of unreported robustness tests, we further investigate if our results hold when using alternative 
relationship lending measures and controlling for regional legal and institutional differences that 
potentially may determine the likelihood of collateral incidence. These tests do not change our 
results.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details our methodology 
and data. Section 3 presents the main empirical results. Section 4 compares our conclusions 
with alternative theories. Section 5 controls for endogeneity problems related to IPOs and 
relationship lending. Section 6 reports the results of further robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 
concludes. Additional results are reported in an Internet Appendix to this paper.  
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2 Methodology and data  
2.1 Methodology 
The methodology of the main analysis contains four parts. First, we investigate if the likelihood of 
collateral incidence increases with relationship lending and market concentration, after controlling 
for a broad range of other determinants. The second part attempts to find evidence that the 
increasing likelihood of collateral incidence is at least partially due to information asymmetries 
between inside and outside banks. To this end, we test if the effects of relationship lending and 
market concentration on collateral are less pronounced for transparent firms, using various 
information transparency proxies. The third part investigates if informational rent extraction is 
moderated for post-IPO loans relative to pre-IPO loans. Finally, we investigate if this moderated 
effect for post-IPO loans varies with firm risk. We discuss the methodologies related to alternative 
explanations, testing of endogeneity of key variables, and further robustness tests in Sections 4, 
5 and 6, respectively.  
2.1.1 RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND MARKET STRUCTURE AS DETERMINANTS OF COLLATERAL 
INCIDENCE  
We start by testing whether relationship lending and market structure are positively correlated 
with collateral in a cross-sectional setting. As discussed in the introduction, a positive correlation 
between relationship intensity and collateral does not automatically imply “informational rent 
extraction”, because at least three competing theories predict the same result (e.g. “bank 
seniority”, “soft budget constraint” and “cost minimization incentive”). In contrast, a negative 
correlation would support the “information accumulation” view, which considers relationship 
lending and collateral as substitutes (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Bharath et al., 2011). With respect to market structure, a positive association with collateral 
would not unequivocally suggest informational rent extraction, but could also imply the use of 
sheer market power in concentrated markets (e.g. Hainz, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002). Hence, 
we postulate the following hypotheses:  
H.1: If relationship lending is negatively related to collateral incidence, the information 
accumulation view holds. In contrast, a positive correlation would reject this.  
H.2: Concentrated markets allow for a higher probability of collateral incidence, either 
because of the existence of informational monopolies, more market power or both. 
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following Probit model:  
 
P(Collateral୧୪) = F൫β଴ + βଵSizeconcen୧୪ + βଶACR4୧୪ + ∑ σ୨Relcontrols୧୪୨ୀଵ + ρIPO୧୪ +
∑ φ୨FC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ θ୨LC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ γ୨MC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ δ୨RC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ α୨୨ୀଵ FE୧୪൯                                [1] 
 
where i indexes for firm, l for loan number, and F(.) is the cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution. The dependent variable Collateral il is a binary variable that 
equals one if loan l extended to firm i is collateralized and zero otherwise. IPO il is a dummy that 
equals one if a loan is issued after the borrower’s IPO and zero otherwise.  
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The strength of bank-firm relationships is traditionally measured by relationship duration, 
defined as the time difference between the first loan obtained and the current one (see e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995). As suggested in Schenone (2010), duration 
may not fully capture how dependent a firm is on its current lender or how “locked in” the firm is 
in the lending relationship. Hence, following Schenone (2010), we measure bank-firm 
relationships by the intensity with which the borrower turns to the same lender. This measure, 
which we call Sizeconcen il, is defined as the amount of loans that firm i borrowed from its current 
lender as a proportion of the total amount of loans which the firm obtained prior to the current 
loan.13 By definition, Sizeconcen il takes values between zero and one. Borrower i is more 
dependent on the lender if Sizeconcen il is closer to one. This measuring of relationship lending 
essentially takes into account what the relative importance of a lender is to the borrower, 
compared to other lenders. The next set of controls Relcontrols il accounts for additional features 
of relationship lending that can affect collateral incidence, including: The number of different 
lenders firm i has borrowed from prior to the current loan, Numlender il; whether the current loan 
is the first loan borrowed from the lender, First il; and whether the current lender is different from 
the previous lender, Switch il. Numlender il controls for the fact that the same value of Sizeconcen il 
does not preclude that a firm has borrowed from a different number of banks. For instance, a 
loan associated with a value for Sizeconcen il of 0.5 can be the result of borrowing from two 
banks, with each accounting for half of the total loans, or borrowing from five banks, with the 
largest loan accounting for half of the total loans. Moreover, the first loan from a specific lender 
(First il) might be subject to different collateral requirements. Finally, we include Switch il to control 
for the possibility that banks may condition their collateral requirements depending on whether 
they can also provide subsequent loans to the same borrower, for instance to minimize costs of 
collateral evaluations. For all these variables, loans originated by either the parent bank or a 
subsidiary are treated as loans from the same lender, since it is likely that the information available 
about the borrowing firm is shared within all subsidiaries. 
Market structure is measured by the concentration ratio ACR4il, which is defined as the 
share of total assets of the four largest banks as a percentage of the total assets of all banks in 
each province at the time of one semi-accounting year prior to the current loan.14 We treat each 
province as a separate banking market.  
The set of variables ܨܥ௜௟ accounts for firm characteristics that are likely to affect 
collateral. These include the age of the firm in (log) months, Age il; (log) total assets, Size il; current 
assets over total assets, Liquidity il; return on total assets, ROA il; tangible assets over total assets, 
Tangibility il; and a firm’s ownership dummy, FTil, which equals one if the Chinese State is the 
majority owner and zero if majority ownership lies in the private sector. Following Berger and 
Udell (1990), we also control for loan concentration measured by the ratio of the size of loan l 
relative to the total amount of debt outstanding prior to the origination of loan l (Loanconcen il); a 
higher value of this variable indicates that loan l represents a relatively large portion of firm’s i 
debt and hence potentially may be more likely to be collateralized. These variables are obtained 
from the semi-annual financial reports that were published the closest to the moment before the 
                                                                          
13. We employ another relationship measure, Numconcenil, defined as the number of loans that firm i borrowed from its 
current lender as a proportion of the total number of loans which the firm obtained prior to the current loan, as a further 
robustness check. Our main results are not sensitive to this alternative measure. Results are available upon request. The 
implicit assumption of Numconcenil is that the inside lender is more informed than outside lenders if the firm borrows more 
times from its current lender, while the amounts borrowed are irrelevant for the accumulation of information. As it is expected 
that banks devote more efforts in assessing firms that borrow larger amounts and subsequently accumulate more firm-
specific information if the loan is relatively large, Sizeconcen il is probably a more precise measure of firm-bank relationships. 
14. For our purpose, market structure should be measured at the regional level. The concentration ratio is the only measure 
available of regional market structures. Market structure is closely related to competition. For a discussion of bank 
competition in China and the results for various competition measures see Xu et al. (2016).  
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loan was originated. This procedure ensures that in our estimations, banks use the most recent 
publicly available accounting information at the time of issuing the loan. All variables in monetary 
term are deflated to 2006 RMB. 
The set of controls ܮܥ௜௟	covers loan characteristics, such as the maturity of loan l in (log) 
months, Maturityil; its (log) size in real terms (deflated to 2006 RMB), Loansize il; and the difference 
between its lending rate and the benchmark deposit rate of a corresponding maturity, Spreadil. 
We also control for monetary policy and regional macro-economic factors (ܯܥ௜௟ and ܴܥ௜௟, 
respectively) that potentially can influence the pledging of collateral (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Jimenez et al., 2006). Monetary policy controls include the reserve 
requirements ratio, RRRil and the 7-day repo rate, Repo il. These variables are matched to the 
month when the loan was originated. Regional macro-economic controls are the provincial real 
GDP growth rate (deflated with national CPI), Realgdpindex il; the provincial non-performing loan 
ratio, NPLratio il; and the provincial consumer price index, CPI il. These variables are matched to 
one semi-accounting year before the loan was originated. All these data come from the CEIC 
database.  
The last set of controls are fixed effects (ܨܧ௜௟) for time (Time), bank-type (Banktype), 
province (Prov) and industry-type (Indu). Time fixed effects capture differences in collateral 
requirements related to the business or credit cycle at the national level. Bank-type fixed effects 
control for systematic differences in bank propensities to require collateral. Provincial fixed effects 
capture systematic differences in collateralization policies across provinces. Industry dummies 
control for differences in technology, production and market conditions across different 
industries, which may account for systematic differences in borrowers’ risks. Some strategic or 
government supported industries might enjoy subsidies or favorable loan contract terms, which 
should also be accounted for by industry dummies. In total seven time dummies, 31 provincial 
dummies, seven bank type dummies and 51 industries dummies are introduced.  
2.1.2 INFORMATIONAL RENTS AND BORROWER TRANSPARENCY  
As a next step, we investigate if the likelihood of rent extraction through collateral, related to 
relationship lending and market concentration, is at least partially due to the informational “hold 
up” problem. To this end, we test if the effects of relationship lending and market concentration 
on collateral incidence are less pronounced for transparent firms, because information about 
these firms is more widely distributed among all lenders. Specifically, we test the following 
specification: 
 
P(Collateral୧୪) = F൫β଴ + βଵSizeconcen୧୪ + βଶACR4୧୪ + βଷSizeconcen୧୪ ∗ Infor୧୪ +
βସACR4୧୪ ∗ Infor୧୪ + ωInfor୧୪ + ∑ σ୨Relcontrols୧୪୨ୀଵ + ρIPO୧୪ + ∑ φ୨FC୧୪୨ୀଵ +
∑ θ୨LC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ γ୨MC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ δ୨RC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ α୨୨ୀଵ FE୧୪൯                                                  [2] 
 
where an informational transparency measure Inforil (higher value representing higher 
firm transparency) is interacted with the relationship lending and market structure variables 
(Sizeconcen il and ACR4il, respectively). If βଵ > 0 and βଷ < 0, or respectively βଶ > 0 and βସ < 0, 
it would lend some support to the idea that relationship lending respectively concentrated 
markets facilitate informational rent extraction, and that rent extraction is relatively more difficult 
if borrowers are transparent.  
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We apply two sets of transparency measures (Infor il): transparency based on firm 
characteristics, and transparency linked to information generated by the stock market. The first 
set of transparency measures includes: listing board (Listmain il); firm ownership (FT il); and firm 
size (Medianta il). Listmain il is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed at the main 
board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and zero if the firm is listed either at the small and 
medium-sized firms’ board (SME board) or the China Next board (ChiNext board).15 Firms listed 
at the latter two boards are typically smaller or high-tech firms, which should be more 
informational opaque. With respect to FT il, since nearly all banks in China are fully or partly owned 
by the state, banks should be better informed about state-owned firms than about private firms. 
Finally, firm size is a standard measure of informational transparency, with smaller firms 
considered to be more informational opaque. We define a dummy Medianta il that equals one if 
the firm’s total assets are above the provincial median, and zero otherwise.  
The second set of transparency measures is related to stock market information 
production. Specifically, we postulate that firm transparency increases with the number of 
financial analysts following the firm (Numalst il), and the percentage of shares held by non-bank 
institutional investors (Instishare il). Furthermore, we investigate if the information spill-over from 
the stock market generates a boundary transparency level beyond which inside and outside 
banks are equally informed, and inside banks can no longer extract informational rents. As these 
information production variables are available only after the listing of the firm, we restrict in this 
case the sample exclusively to post-IPO loans.  
However, since these informational transparency proxies are also correlated with the 
probability of firms’ financial distress or bargaining power, this identification strategy cannot fully 
differentiate the “hold-up” problem from competing theories. For instance, under the assumption 
that larger firms are less likely to face financial distress when compared with smaller firms, these 
firms have less incentives to pledge collateral to relationship lenders in exchange of a possible 
future rescue, leading to a smaller impact of relationship intensity on collateral incidence of the 
former relative to the latter firms. Moreover, the implicit guarantee enjoyed by state owned firms 
may render collateral irrelevant in exchange for possible future support from their relationship 
lenders, which can lead to a lower impact of relationship intensity on collateral incidence for these 
firms. Similarly, as larger firms or state owned firms may have greater bargaining power, market 
structure could affect their collateral pledging less than in the case of smaller or private firms. The 
stock market information production measures could also be positively related to firm size or 
financial health. Namely, larger firms are generally followed by a greater number of analysts, and 
non-bank institutional investors are more likely to invest in financially stronger firms. These 
arguments suggest that the coefficients of the interaction terms should be negative, a result that 
may be independent from the informational rent extraction hypothesis. To better test this 
hypothesis, we use equity IPOs as informational equalization shocks that reveal information to all 
banks and therefore reduce the capacity of inside banks to extract informational rents.  
2.1.3 EQUITY IPOS AS STRATEGY TO IDENTIFY INFORMATIONAL RENT EXTRACTION 
This subsection formulates the methodology applying equity IPOs to identify informational rent 
extraction. This strategy hinges on the following observations. Before an IPO, inside banks enjoy 
superior information obtained from lending relationships, which allows for rent extraction through 
                                                                          
15. The listing boards are unknown for loans obtained before the listing. However, both firms and banks should have some 
idea about which listing board will be the most likely outcome when the firm applies for an IPO, given the characteristics of 
the firm. The lengthy approval process of the CSRC also suggests that firms need to decide at which board they will list long 
before the actual listing. As a robustness check, we reproduce the Listmain regression using loans issued only after listing. 
Our results hold for this alternative sample as well. Results are available upon request. 
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collateral. After an IPO, the constant release of information and market monitoring avoid that any 
inside bank obtains or maintains an informational monopoly position, therefore alleviating the 
adverse selection problems facing outside banks. Furthermore, a secondary effect might be at 
work which can reinforce the direct effect of an IPO in reducing information asymmetries among 
inside and outside banks. Because an IPO will reveal information to all banks, inside banks are 
less incentivized to acquire additional but costly information to maintain their informational 
monopoly. This may be caused by a decreasing return on investment in information or an 
increasing cost of accumulating additional information in markets where all banks are well 
informed. Banks may also free-ride when costly information can be produced and disseminated 
by the stock market. With less investment in information production after an IPO, information 
asymmetries among banks are reduced further. These arguments suggest that the informational 
monopolies of inside banks are greatly reduced after IPOs, making rent extraction through 
collateral less likely.  
Similar arguments apply to market structure. As discussed in Section 1, when borrowers 
lack a credible channel for disseminating information, such as before an equity IPO, concentrated 
markets permit more efficient information extraction (Marquez, 2002), better re-usability of 
information (Boot and Thakor, 2010; Chan et al., 1986; Berlin and Mester, 1999), better 
protection of information from spilling over to outside banks and deterring entry of competitors 
which self-reinforces information monopolies (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001). After 
an IPO, information is made public to outside banks through regularly published financial 
statements, public auditing, financial analysts’ research and movements in stock prices. Hence, 
the contribution of market concentration in facilitating the existence of information asymmetries 
among lenders becomes less important, which erodes the possibility of informational rent 
extraction.  
We formulate the following hypotheses:  
H.3: If relationship lenders extract informational rents through collateral, this will be more 
likely for loans originated before the equity IPO and less likely for those originated after the IPO. 
If this moderated effect for post-IPO loans is not supported by the empirical results, alternative 
theories should explain the positive correlation between relationship lending and collateral 
incidence.    
H.4: The positive correlation of market concentration with collateral should be mitigated 
by the informational shock of an equity IPO. If this result is not established, the positive impact 
of market concentration on collateral incidence is attributed to market power.    
To test these hypotheses, we introduce the interaction terms of the relationship intensity 
and market structure variables, respectively, with the dummy variable IPO in Equation (1), which 
yields Equation (3): 
 
P(Collateral୧୪) = F൫β଴ + βଵSizeconcen୧୪ + βଶACR4୧୪ + βଷSizeconcen୧୪ ∗ IPO୧୪ +
βସACR4୧୪ ∗ IPO୧୪ + ∑ σ୨Relcontrols୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ μ୨Relcontrols୧୪ ∗ IPO୧୪୨ୀଵ + ρIPO୧୪ +
∑ φ୨FC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ θ୨LC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ γ୨MC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ δ୨RC୧୪୨ୀଵ + ∑ α୨୨ୀଵ FE୧୪൯                             [3] 
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where IPO il equals one if loan l is issued after the IPO and zero otherwise. Informational 
rent extraction by relationship lenders is identified if ߚଵ > 0 and ߚଷ < 0. Similarly, market 
concentration facilitates informational rent extraction if ߚଶ > 0 and ߚସ < 0. If ߚଷ < 0 or ߚସ < 0 is 
rejected, the positive coefficients of ߚଵ	and ߚଶ should be explained by other theories. We include 
the interaction term Relcontrols il * IPO il to control for the possible heterogeneous impact of other 
relationship characteristics on collateral incidence before and after the IPO.  
Two important caveats must be kept in mind. First, as discussed in Section 1, the 
moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral could be explained by theories other than 
informational rent extraction. We discuss and test these alternative explanations in Section 4. A 
second caveat is related to the endogeneity assumptions related to the equity IPOs and 
relationship lending. In practice, both variables could be endogenous due to omitted variables. 
We address this issue using recursive bivariate Probit models in Section 5. We discuss some 
further robustness tests in Section 6.  
2.1.4 INFORMATIONAL RENT EXTRACTION AND FIRM RISK 
Rajan (1992) suggested that inside banks can charge informational rents more easily from riskier 
borrowers than from safer ones, because outside banks will be less inclined to lend once the 
borrower is revealed as risky. This view suggests that when information asymmetries between 
inside and outside banks are reduced, rent extraction will decline for safer firms but not for risky 
ones. We test if this prediction applies to collateral as well (see Hale and Santos, 2009, for similar 
tests using bond IPOs on lending rates).   
We propose a novel measure of firm risk: whether the first IPO application of a firm was 
rejected by the CSRC or not, Multiapp il. A firm’s listing request can be rejected by the CSRC on 
many grounds, such as cash-flow problems, uncertain or weak profitability perspectives, vague 
corporate governance structures or suspicious earnings, all of which suggest the potential 
existence of risk factors that do not meet the CSRC’s listing requirements. In a way, this measure 
is similar to a credit rating (see Hale and Santos, 2009), but now the firm is rated by a government 
body instead of private sector rating companies. To test this hypothesis, we expand the baseline 
Equation (3) with three-way interaction terms between informational rent variables (Sizeconcen il 
and ACR4il), IPO il, and the firm risk proxy Multiapp il. 
2.2 Data 
We manually collect loan-level data from the financial reports of listed firms, published by Wind 
Finance Co., Ltd. Hence, our analysis departs importantly from most studies on Chinese loan 
markets, which either use yearly aggregate firm-level data from the China Securities Markets and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) (e.g. Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013) or rely on 
loan-level datasets provided by a few state-owned banks (Chang et al., 2014; Qian et al., 2015).  
Our dataset consists of 10,654 loans made to 676 firms listed at the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) between 2007 and 2013.1617 The size of the sample is reduced by some 
recording errors, incomplete loan contract information and questionable financial data. In 
                                                                          
16. We concentrate on firms listed at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange because they are more diverse in terms of size and 
industry when compared with those listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Our sample starts in 2007 because listed firms 
were required to comprehensively report their loan records from 2007 onwards.  
17. Unfortunately, listed firms do not report if their loans are syndicated loans or not. This shortcoming is unlikely to affect 
our analysis as syndicated loans are rare in China. Pessarossi et al. (2012) investigate syndicated loans obtained by Chinese 
listed firms for the period 1999-2009. Only a very small sample of 92 syndicated loans was registered for this period. The 
syndicated loan market in China amounted to less than 30 billion dollars in 2009 (Dealscan), a very small number compared 
to the total amount of loans outstanding.       
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particular, loans issued at rates below the lending rate floor (i.e. below 90% of the baseline 
lending rate) are removed, because these loans are likely to have been issued at non-commercial 
terms. We further remove loans to financial institutions and loans made in foreign currencies. This 
all reduces our database to 9,288 loans provided to 649 listed non-financial firms. Our database 
provides information on multiple borrowings by each firm (on average, each firm has 20 loans in 
our sample) and from multiple banks (on average four banks per firm), including almost all types 
of Chinese banks. 
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Table I. 66% of the loans in our 
database are collateralized, which is comparable to figures recorded for other emerging market 
economies, such as 53% for Mexico (La Porta et al., 2003) and 72% for Thailand (Menkhoff et 
al., 2006). Our main relationship variable Sizeconcen il has an average value of 0.33, suggesting 
that on average around one third of the amount of loans is obtained from the current lender. The 
concentration ratio ACR4 il, which is our proxy for market structure, has an average of 0.55, 
indicating that the four largest banks in each province on average hold 55% of the total provincial 
banking assets.   
The summary statistics for IPO il show that 83% of the loans in our sample were issued 
after an IPO. Among the 649 firms in our sample, 111 firms reported at least one loan before 
their IPO and at least one after; in total these firms had 2,181 loans, representing 23% of all 
loans. The rest of the firms only had loans either before their IPO (142 firms with 660 loans) or 
after (396 firms with 6,447 loans). Furthermore, our sample consists of relatively old (on average 
13 years) and large firms (average total assets of RMB 2,139.5 million). Regarding firm ownership 
(FT il), firms with state majority ownership represent 33% of all firms in our sample and take up 
40% of all loans.  
Regarding the controls for loan characteristics, the average maturity of the loans in our 
sample (Maturity il) is around two years (25.9 months), while average size (Loansize il) in real terms 
is RMB 62.6 million. The average spread between loan lending rates and corresponding deposit 
rates (Spread il) is 2.85%. 
Of the other controls, we provide further detail only for the variable that we used to 
investigate rent extraction and firm risk, i.e. Multiappi that measures if the firm is rejected in its 
first IPO application. 40 firms, or around 7% of all firms, were rejected for IPO evaluation when 
they applied for the first time (but were eventually listed, after multiple applications). Definitions 
and summary statistics of instrumental variables and additional variables are discussed in their 
respective sections, but are all reported in Table I, panels F and G.  
Table I: Summary statistics and variable definition 
Variable Definition N Mean S.D Min Max 
Panel A: Market structure 
ACR4 The market share (in terms of assets) of the top 
four banks in the province. Measured at one semi-
accounting year prior to current loan. 
9288 
0.5
5 
0.0
6 
0.35 0.97 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in millions of 
RMB deflated to year 2006 value. Measured at 
one semi-accounting year prior to current loan.   
8779 
7.6
7 
1.1
6 
4.01 
12.7
2  
Leverage Outstanding debt/total assets, measured at one 
semi-accounting year prior to current loan. 
8779 
0.5
6 
0.1
9 
0.02 2.37 
 
ROA 8779 -0.44 1.71 
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Return on assets, measured at one semi-
accounting year prior to current loan. 
0.0
6 
0.0
7 
Age Natural log of firm age. Firm age is the difference 
in months between the firm’s establishment date 
and the loan initiation date. 
9288 
5.0
3 
0.4
0 
2.77 6.62 
 
Tangibility (Net property, plants and equipment)/total assets, 
measured at one semi-accounting year prior to 
current loan. 
8779 
0.2
7 
0.1
9 
0.00 0.92 
 
FT 
= 1 if majority stake is owned by the State, and 0 
otherwise. 
9288 
0.4
0 
0.4
9 
0 1 
Liquidity Current assets/total assets, measured at one semi-
accounting year prior to current loan. 
8779 
0.5
5 
0.2
3 
0.01 1 
 
Loanconcen Loan concentration ratio. Defined as Loansize / 
(Loansize and debt outstanding). 
8779 
0.0
4 
0.0
7 
0.00 0.93 
 
IPO 
= 1 if loan is issued after the IPO, and 0 
otherwise. 
9288 
0.8
3 
0.3
7 
0 1 
Panel C: Loan characteristics  
Collateral 
= 1 if loan is secured by collateral, and 0 
otherwise. 
9288 
0.6
6 
0.4
7 
0 1 
Maturity Natural log of loan maturity. Measured in months. 9288 
3.2
5 
0.7
9 
0.00 5.70 
Spread Difference between lending rate and benchmark 
deposit rate of corresponding maturity. Measured 
in percentage. 
9288 
2.8
5 
1.2
1 
0.71 
13.6
0  
Loansize Natural log of loan size. Measured in millions of 
RMB deflated to year 2006 value. 
9288 
3.1
3 
1.4
1 
-3.70 8.97 
 
Panel D: Relationship variables 
Numlender Number of different lenders the firm has 
borrowed from prior to origination of current 
loan. 
9288 
3.9
3 
3.4
5 
0 28 
 
Sizeconcen The amount of loans that a firm has borrowed 
from its current lender as a proportion of the total 
amount of loans it obtained prior to the current 
loan.  
9288 
0.3
3 
0.3
5 
0 1 
 
Numconcen The number of loans that a firm has borrowed 
from its current lender as a proportion of the total 
number of loans it borrowed prior to the current 
loan. 
9288 
0.3
4 
0.3
4 
0 1 
 
First = 1 if the current loan is the first loan borrowed 
from this lender, and 0 otherwise. 
9288 
0.2
4 
0.4
3 
0 1 
 
Switch = 1 if the current loan is borrowed from the same 
lender as the previous loan, and 0 otherwise. 
9288 
0.4
0 
0.4
9 
0 1 
 
Panel E: Monetary and regional macroeconomic variables 
RRR 
Reserve Requirement Ratio for the month when 
the loan is issued.  
9288 
0.1
7 
0.0
3 
0.10 0.21 
Repo 
7-day repo rate for the month when the loan is 
issued, in percentage.  
9288 
2.5
5 
1.2
1 
0.94 6.92 
CPI Provincial consumer price index, measured at one 
semi-account year prior to current loan.  
9288 
1.0
3 
0.0
3 
0.98 1.10 
 
NPLratio Provincial non-Performing loan ratio, measured at 
one semi-account year prior to current loan. 
9288 
0.0
3 
0.0
3 
0.00 0.21 
 
Realgdpindex Provincial real GDP growth rate, measured at one 
semi-account year prior to current loan 
9288 
0.0
9 
0.0
3 
0.01 0.18 
 
Panel F: Instrumental variables 
Amaturity ((current assets/total assets)*(current assets/cost 
of goods sold)+(fixed assets/total assets)*(fixed 
assets/depreciation))/1000 
9288 
10.6
8 
6.64 0.18 
55.3
3  
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dd_lag2 
The number of CSRC IPO suspension days during 
the 2-year window prior to listing date.  
9288 
188.
6 
168.
8 
0 523 
Affected_Firms 
Dummy variable equals 1 if firm experienced at 
least one CSRC IPO suspension during the 2-year 
window prior to listing date.  
9288 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Termspread Yield difference between 5-year Treasury bond 
and 1-year Treasury bond, for the month when the 
loan is issued, in percentage. 
9288 0.86 0.44 -0.19 1.54 
 
Localavrate People’s Bank of China reports on a yearly basis 
the percentage of loans that are issued 
below/at/above the corresponding benchmark 
rate. The actual lending rate to benchmark rate 
ratio is classified in seven groups: [0.9,1], [1], 
[1.0-1.1], [1.1-1.3],[1.3-1.5],[1.5-2.0] and [above 
2.0]. We take the middle value of each group and 
calculate the weighted average ratio using the 
percentage of loans within each group as weight. 
This weighted average is then multiplied with the 
one-year reference rate to calculate the regional 
average lending rates. Measured at one semi-
account year prior to the current loan. In 
percentage. 
9288 6.79 0.94 5.14 9.88 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benchsprd Benchmark lending rate minus benchmark deposit 
rate of corresponding maturity, for the month the 
loan is issued. In percentage. 
9288 
2.4
2 
0.5
5 
1.4 3.78 
 
Panel G: Additional variables 
Numalst 
Number of analysts following the firms measured 
at one semi-accounting year before loan 
origination. 
7719 
11.0
1 
10.9
0 
0 66 
Instishare 
Percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors measured at one semi-accounting year 
before loan origination, in percentage. 
7367 
29.0
7 
22.0
3 
0 
96.3
3 
Multiapp 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm applied for 
its IPO multiple times before eventually listed, 
and 0 if succeeded in the first IPO application. 
9288 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Affected_Loans 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the loan is borrowed 
by firms that experienced CSRC IPO suspension 
during the suspension periods. 
9288 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
3 Main results 
3.1 Univariate tests 
This subsection compares if the mean values of the key variables differ across relationship 
intensity, market structure and for pre- and post-IPO loans. Results are reported in Table II.  
Relationship loans, defined as the ones with Sizeconcen il above the sample median, on 
average enjoy better loan terms such as longer maturity and lower lending spreads. At the same 
time, these loans are smaller; however, collateral requirements do not differ significantly between 
relationship and non-relationship loans.  
Collateral requirements are significantly more severe in concentrated markets, where 
concentrated markets are defined as the ones with ACR4 il above the sample median. Loan 
maturity does not differ across markets, while loan size and the average lending spread are 
significantly larger in lowly concentrated markets. Lastly, loan contract terms such as collateral 
(-), maturity (+) and loan size (+) change significantly after listing (in brackets change after IPO 
compared to before), while the average lending spread does not differ for loans issued before 
and after IPOs. 
Firm characteristics do not depict a clear pattern between groups. For instance, firms 
that borrow from relationship lenders are on average more liquid, less leveraged and have higher 
tangibility ratios. However, they are also younger and smaller than firms borrowing from non-
relationship banks. Firms that borrow in concentrated markets are on average less liquid, smaller, 
younger and more leveraged, and have higher tangibility ratios. Lastly, firms that borrowed after 
the IPO are less liquid and less profitable, but the leverage ratio of borrowing firms does not differ 
before and after the IPO.  
Table II: Univariate tests 
 Panel A: Sizeconcen  Panel B: ACR4  Panel C: IPO 
 <Median >=Median Mean 
diff 
<Median >=Median Mean 
diff 
Pre-
IPO 
Post-
IPO 
Mean 
diff 
Relationship variables 
Sizeconcen -- -- -- 0.32 0.35 -
0.02*** 
0.40 0.32 0.08*** 
Numconcen 0.22 0.73 -
0.51*** 
0.33 0.35 -
0.02*** 
0.41 0.33 0.08*** 
Numlender 4.65 3.21 1.44*** 4.41 3.46 0.96*** 2.17 4.29 -
2.11*** 
Market structure 
ACR4 0.55 0.55 -0.00* - - - 0.56 0.55 0.01*** 
Loan characteristics 
Collateral 0.66 0.66 -0.00 0.62 0.70 -
0.08*** 
0.86 0.62 0.24*** 
Maturity 3.19 3.32 -
0.13*** 
3.26 3.25 0.00 3.12 3.28 -
0.16*** 
Spread 2.99 2.70 0.30*** 2.87 2.82 0.04* 2.85 2.85 0.01 
Loansize 3.19 3.07 0.12*** 3.17 3.10 0.08** 2.32 3.30 -
0.97*** 
Firm characteristics 
FT 0.42 0.39 -0.03** 0.42 0.39 0.03*** 0.11 0.46 -
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0.35*** 
Liquidity 0.55 0.54 0.01* 0.60 0.50 0.10*** 0.58 0.54 0.04*** 
Total Assets 7.76 7.58 0.18*** 7.81 7.53 0.28*** 6.32 7.85 -
1.53*** 
Leverage 0.57 0.55 0.02*** 0.55 0.57 -
0.02*** 
0.55 0.56 -0.00 
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.00 0.15 0.05 0.09*** 
Age 5.04 5.02 0.02*** 5.06 5.00 0.06*** 4.70 5.10 -
0.40*** 
Tangibility 0.27 0.27 -0.01* 0.24 0.31 -
0.07*** 
0.27 0.27 -0.01 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
3.2  Multivariate tests 
3.2.1 DO RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND MARKET STRUCTURE DETERMINE COLLATERAL 
INCIDENCE? 
In this section, we first test the impact of relationship lending and market structure on collateral 
incidence in a cross-sectional setting by estimating Equation (1) in Section 2.1.1. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table III. Marginal effects (M.E.) are calculated based on the results in 
Column (1). To account for the possibility that some loan contract terms such as Maturity and 
Spread might be endogenous, we follow Berger and Udell (1995) and estimate the model with 
and without these terms (Columns (1) and (2), respectively). We shall conduct additional 
robustness tests for endogeneity issues of loan contract terms in Section 6.2.   
Our results show that relationship intensity is positively related to the incidence of 
collateral and highly significant. The marginal effects show that one standard deviation increase 
in Sizeconcen from its sample mean increases the probability of collateralization by 1.4%. This 
result does not support the “information accumulation” view that relationship lending and 
collateral are substitutes in mitigating borrower risks (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995). In contrast, 
our finding is in line with the other hypotheses discussed in Section 1 (e.g. “hold-up” problem 
(Sharp, 1990; Rajan, 1992), “soft budget constraint” (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Boot, 
2000), “bank seniority” (Longhofer and Santos, 2000) and “cost minimization incentive” 
(Menkhoff et al., 2006)). Results similar to ours have been reported in e.g. Elsas and Krahnen 
(2000) and Ono and Uesugi (2009).  
Market structure, measured as the concentration ratio ACR4, is positive and highly 
significant at 1% across all specifications. A one standard deviation increase in this ratio increases 
the likelihood of collateral incidence by 4.45%. This result confirms Hypothesis H.2 (Section 
2.1.1) that concentrated markets are associated with a higher likelihood of collateralization. Our 
finding is in line with Hainz et al. (2013), but contrasts Jimenez et al. (2006). As discussed before, 
both the “informational rent extraction” and “market power” hypotheses can explain this positive 
coefficient.  
The coefficient of Numlender is significant and positive as well. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of lenders of the firm from its mean increases the incidence of collateral 
by 2.13%.18 Other relationship control variables such as First and Switch are not statistically 
significant; we shall discuss these results in more detail later on.  
                                                                          
18. This result is in line with Chakraborty and Hu (2006) and Jimenez et al. (2006), but in contrast to Menkhoff et al. (2006). 
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Loans obtained after the IPO are significantly less likely to be collateralized (marginal 
effect is -10.39%). This result lends some support to the notion that IPOs are beneficial to firms 
with respect to the non-price terms of lending. This adds to the empirical findings in Santos and 
Winton (2008), Hale and Santos (2009) and Schenone (2010) that loan terms improve after bond 
or equity IPOs, with these studies presenting evidence of a decline in the lending rate. 
Before moving forward, we discuss briefly other determinants of collateral, which has 
merit in itself, as the existing literature on Chinese lending markets has investigated this issue 
only using firm-year data (e.g. Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013). As expected, the coefficients 
of Age and Size are negative and significant, indicating that older and larger firms are less likely 
to pledge collateral, possibly because these firms are less prone to moral hazard problems. Firms 
that are more profitable, more liquid, have a higher tangible assets ratio and are less leveraged 
are less likely to pledge collateral. Similar to Berger and Udell (1990), we find that Loanconcen is 
significantly positive at the 1% level across all specifications.19 Among all factors, the most 
important determinant of collateral is firm ownership. Private firms in China have on average a 
16.7% higher probability of pledging collateral than state-owned firms, presumably because the 
latter enjoy the implicit guarantee from the State. This results adds to the previous empirical 
studies that private firms in China have been financially discriminated in a state-dominant banking 
system (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2005).  
Other loan contract terms affect the incidence of collateral as well. Loans with a longer 
maturity are more likely to be collateralized. A one standard deviation increase in loan maturity 
from its sample mean increases the incidence of collateral by 3.39%. This result is in line with 
the theoretical prediction that banks use shorter loan maturities to solve adverse selection or 
moral hazard problems (e.g. Berlin and Mester, 1992; Flannery, 1986; Barclay et al., 1995; 
Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Larger loans (Loansize) are less likely to be collateralized. 
A one standard deviation increase of loan size reduces the incidence of collateral by 3.37%.20 
Finally, loans with a higher interest rate spread (Spread) are more likely to be collateralized 
(marginal effect of 1%), giving some support to the notion that collateral is associated with 
risky loans. Nevertheless, the results for contract terms on collateral should be treated with 
caution, as these variables are potentially endogenous. Excluding potentially endogenous loan 
contract terms such as Maturity and Spread does not alter our results for other determinants, 
as shown in Column (2).  
In contrast, the monetary policy stance has limited impact on the incidence of collateral, 
with only the 7-day Repo rate being positively related to collateral at the 10% significance level.21 
Regional macroeconomic variables (CPI, NPLratio and Realgdpindex) generally do not affect 
collateral decisions. It is likely that the impact of business cycle developments is captured by the 
time fixed effects, which show that collateral incidence is significantly lower during the 2010-
2013 period relative to 2007 (base year). Lastly, loans from foreign banks are significantly more 
likely to be collateralized, while loans from trust and finance companies and other financial 
institutions (mainly credit companies) are significantly less collateralized, compared to the 
benchmark state-owned banks. As a further robustness check, we include regional legal and 
                                                                          
19. See for instance Boot et al. (1991), Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) for similar results. 
20. This result is consistent with Leeth and Scott (1989), Jimenez and Saurina (2004) and Menkhoff et al. (2006), but in 
contrast to the findings of Boot et al. (1991). 
21. Jimenez et al. (2006) find that collateral incidence is lower during episodes of monetary tightening. They resort to credit 
rationing to explain their results, since during tightening periods banks prefer high-quality borrowers (hence less collateral). 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggest that higher interest rates raise a firm’s default probability, resulting in a higher likelihood 
of collateral incidence during monetary policy tightening cycles. Our insignificant result could be due to the combined effect 
of competing theories, which we shall leave to future research.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
institutional variables.22 Our results do not materially change when these additional controls are 
added.  
3.2.2 DOES RENT EXTRACTION VARY WITH FIRM INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY? 
We test in this section if informational rent extraction is less pronounced for transparent firms. To 
this extent, we estimate Equation (2) in Section 2.1.2 using various informational transparency 
proxies. Results are reported in Table III, Panels B and C, where Panel B uses firm characteristics 
as transparency measure, while Panel C employs stock market information production variables.   
Firms that are not listed at the main board, privately owned or smaller, are more likely 
to pledge collateral when relationship intensity increases, as suggested by the significantly 
positive coefficients of Sizeconcen il in all specifications of Panel B. For transparent firms, the 
impact of Sizeconcen il on collateral vanishes, as the null-hypothesis H0: Sizeconcen il + Infor il * 
Sizeconcen il = 0 is not rejected for all three informational transparency measures. As for the 
impact of market structure on collateral, a similar pattern prevails. The concentration ratio ACR4il 
is statistically positive in all specifications, and its interaction term with information transparency 
measures is significantly negative for all three cases. Unlike for relationship lending, the null 
hypothesis that market structure has no impact on collateral for transparent firm (e.g. firms listed 
at the main board or state-owned firms), i.e. ACR4il + Infor il * ACR4 il = 0, is rejected. Both results 
suggest the inside banks’ ability to charge rent decreases with firms’ information transparency.   
Next we employ stock market information production variables (Numalst il and Instishare il) 
as proxies of firm transparency. Results are reported in Panel C, Columns (6) and (7). All 
interaction terms are significantly negative, indicating a moderated effect on rent extraction when 
more information is generated by the stock market, a result similar to Panel B. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the coefficients further suggests a boundary effect of information production on 
rent extraction. In other words, rent extraction becomes infeasible when sufficient information is 
produced by the stock market. Specifically, in Column (6), when a borrower is followed by more 
than 11 analysts (65th percentile), the positive impact of Sizeconcen vanishes. Similarly, a higher 
market concentration does not increase collateral incidence for borrowers followed by more than 
22 analysts (88th percentile). Column (7) reports similar results where Instishare serves as a 
measure of information production23. The thresholds for relationship lending and market 
concentration to charge rents are 20% (55th percentile) and 70% (96th percentile) of shares held 
by non-bank institutional investors, respectively. For firms with institutional shareholdings above 
these values, rent extraction becomes infeasible. The results in this subsection are in line with 
the informational rent hypothesis. However, as discussed in the Section 1 and Section 2.1.2, 
alternative theories can also support these findings as information transparency measures are 
                                                                          
22. Empirical studies have identified that banks are better able to control for credit risk if legal frameworks allow lenders to 
seize collateralized assets in times of default (Qian and Strahan, 2007). We employ the indices of legal infrastructure 
developed by Fan and Wang (2011). These indices have been widely applied for China (e.g. Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009), 
with Li et al. (2009) providing a detailed description. As data for these indices end in 2009 (while our sample ends in 2013), 
we interpolate the missing values by assuming that the indices grow at the average growth rate of 2006-2009. Our results 
show that collateral is more likely to be pledged in provinces with better legal infrastructure, a result that is similar to Qian 
and Strahan (2007). These authors suggest that a better protection of credit rights increases the incidence of collateral for 
firms with more tangible assets. The results that we present in the rest of the paper are not sensitive to the inclusion of these 
legal and institutional variables. Results are available upon request.   
23. Arguably, institutional investors not only bring on board more information disclosure, but also active monitoring and 
better alignment of management incentives, such as reducing tunneling behavior (e.g. Lin et al., 2011). We control for these 
effects by incorporating corporate governance variables that directly affect firms’ tunneling incentives: the “control and cash 
flow rights wedge” and cash-flow rights. Our results remain intact and are available upon request.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
often correlated with firm quality or likelihood of financial distress. We proceed in the next 
subsection using equity IPOs as the identification strategy.  
Table III: Collateral determinants and borrower information transparency 
Panel A shows the results for the estimation of Equation (1). M.E are the marginal effects 
calculated on the basis of the results in Column (1). Panel B estimates Equation (2). It reports the 
impact of ܵ݅ݖ݁ܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊௜௟ and ܣܥܴ4௜௟ on collateral incidence differentiated by the informational 
transparency of borrowers (ܫ݂݊݋ݎ௜௟), which is defined by three proxies: Borrower ownership (FT=1 
if state owned and 0 otherwise); Listed Board (Listmain=1 if listed in the main board and 0 
otherwise); and Firm Size ( Medianta = 1if log (total assets) is above the provincial median and 0 
otherwise). Panel C estimates Equation (2) using stock market information production (Numalst 
and Instishare) as measures of informational transparency of borrowers. The sample is restricted 
to post-IPO loans for Column (6) and (7). In all panels, the control variables include firm 
characteristics, loan contract terms, monetary policy variables, regional macroeconomic 
variables and a set of fixed effects, including Industry, Province, Banktype and Loan-year 
dummies. In column (2), Maturity and Spread are excluded for endogeneity concerns. Removing 
these terms in Panel B and C do not affect our results, which are available upon request. Results 
for fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. The equations are estimated with the 
Probit model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Panel A: Main 
Effects 
 Panel B: Borrower Information 
Transparency 
Panel C: Stock 
Market Infor 
Production 
 With 
contract 
Without 
contract 
M.E Board of 
listing 
Ownership Firm size Numalst Instishare
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sizeconcen 0.153** 0.170** 1.40 0.231*** 0.256*** 0.287*** 0.209** 0.277***
 (0.068) (0.068)  (0.085) (0.082) (0.076) (0.088) (0.097) 
ACR4 2.685*** 2.623*** 4.45 3.826*** 3.463*** 3.482*** 4.912*** 4.897*** 
 (0.805) (0.802)  (0.895) (0.858) (0.832) (0.901) (0.924) 
Listmain*Sizeconcen    -0.129     
    (0.098)     
FT*Sizeconcen     -0.203**    
     (0.098)    
Medianta*Sizeconcen      -   
      (0.102)   
Numalst*Sizeconcen       -0.010**  
       (0.005)  
Instishare*Sizeconcen        -
        (0.240) 
Listmain*ACR4    -     
    (0.616)     
FT*ACR4     -1.603***    
     (0.619)    
Medianta*ACR4      -   
      (0.571)   
Numalst*ACR4       -  
       (0.032)  
Instishare*ACR4        -
        (1.318) 
Listmain    0.705**     
    (0.346)     
Medianta      1.334***   
      (0.316)   
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Numalst       0.074***  
       (0.017)  
Instishare        2.574*** 
        (0.722) 
FT - - -16.7 - 0.335 - - -
 (0.047) (0.046)  (0.048) (0.340) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) 
First 0.036 0.049 0.94 0.048 0.044 0.019 -0.030 -0.042 
 (0.056) (0.055)  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) 
Switch -0.028 -0.064 -0.75 -0.033 -0.028 -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.039) (0.039)  (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
IPO - - - - -0.391*** -   
 (0.071) (0.071)  (0.073) (0.071) (0.071)   
Numlender 0.024*** 0.018** 2.13 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Liquidity - - -2.76 - -0.447*** -0.375** - -
 (0.155) (0.153)  (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.168) (0.167) 
Size - - -7.29 - -0.222*** - - -
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) 
Leverage 0.941*** 1.049*** 4.53 1.040*** 0.926*** 0.951*** 0.891*** 0.963*** 
 (0.127) (0.126)  (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.138) (0.137) 
ROA - - -2.22 - -1.102*** - -0.583* -0.704** 
 (0.277) (0.282)  (0.279) (0.278) (0.276) (0.330) (0.325) 
Age - - -4.50 - -0.419*** - - -
 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) 
Tangibility - - -4.43 - -0.855*** - - -
 (0.179) (0.178)  (0.180) (0.179) (0.179) (0.189) (0.188) 
Maturity 0.169***  3.39 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 
 (0.028)   (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Spread 0.031*  1.00 0.036** 0.031* 0.035** 0.021 0.023 
 (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Loansize - - -3.37 - -0.090*** - - -
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Loanconcen 1.830*** 1.921*** 3.37 1.956*** 1.804*** 1.866*** 1.779*** 1.672*** 
 (0.413) (0.408)  (0.410) (0.414) (0.415) (0.440) (0.434) 
RRR -0.071 -0.021 -0.05 0.050 -0.202 -0.188 0.645 0.422 
 (2.902) (2.884)  (2.909) (2.904) (2.907) (3.068) (3.068) 
Repo 0.048* 0.045* 1.51 0.044 0.048* 0.050* 0.054* 0.047* 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
CPI 1.475 2.003 1.04 1.241 1.320 1.518 2.608 2.614 
 (1.510) (1.501)  (1.514) (1.513) (1.513) (1.601) (1.597) 
NPLratio -0.535 -0.647 -0.42 -0.305 -0.526 -0.685 -0.414 -0.121 
 (1.135) (1.132)  (1.137) (1.135) (1.140) (1.183) (1.179) 
Realgdpindex 1.097 1.548 1.00 0.763 0.787 0.975 1.606 1.198 
 (1.435) (1.429)  (1.441) (1.442) (1.439) (1.500) (1.496) 
Constant -0.566 -0.644  -1.577 -0.850 -1.123 -7.478 -6.924 
 (1.874) (1.869)  (1.888) (1.879) (1.884) (106.776) (106.273)
Observations 8,741 8,753  8,741 8,741 8,741 7,620 7,620 
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.283  0.289 0.288 0.290 0.291 0.291 
H0:Sizeconcen+Infor*Sizeconcen=0    0.102 0.052 -0.103   
H0: ACR4+Infor*ACR4=0    2.162*** 1.860** 1.431   
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3.2.3 DO EQUITY IPOS REDUCE INFORMATIONAL RENTS? 
In this subsection, we provide a direct test of informational rent extraction, i.e. we compare the 
impact of Sizeconcenil and ACR4il on collateral incidence for pre-IPO and post-IPO loans where 
information asymmetries among lenders are significantly lower for the latter group than for the 
former. Estimations are based on Equation (3). 
Results are reported in Table IV. Column (1) includes only the interaction term 
Sizeconcen il * IPO il; Column (2) includes only the interaction term ACR4 il * IPO il; Column (3) 
includes both, while Column (4) re-estimates Column (3) excluding possible endogenous loan 
contract terms (Maturity and Spread). The results show that Sizeconcen il is significantly positive 
across all models. The coefficient of the interaction term Sizeconcen il * IPO il is negative and 
significant for the broader specification (Column (3)), while it is marginally insignificant (p-value 
0.102) in Column (1). The coefficient of ACR4il is significantly positive while the interaction term 
with IPO il is significantly negative across all specifications. As the results of these three 
specifications are quantitatively similar, we explain in more detail only the results presented in 
Column (3), our baseline model.  
The likelihood of pledging collateral is increasing with relationship intensity for pre-IPO 
loans (coefficient 0.596***), while for post-IPO loans this positive impact is greatly moderated 
(coefficient 0.124*, and H0: Sizeconcen il + Sizeconcen il * IPO il = 0 is rejected at the 10% level). In 
terms of marginal effects, a one standard deviation increase in Sizeconcenil increases the 
probability of pledging collateral by 4.78% for pre-IPO loans, compared to 1.17% for post-IPO 
loans. This pattern is consistent with Hypothesis H.3 (Section 2.1.3) that a reduction in 
informational asymmetries among banks makes it harder to establish informational “hold-ups” 
through relationship lending, therefore lowering the likelihood of rent extraction through collateral. 
.  
A similar pattern is observed for market structure. The pre-IPO coefficient of the 
concentration ratio ACR4 il is 5.94***, indicating that pre-IPO loans obtained in concentrated 
markets are significantly more likely to be collateralized. The post-IPO impact of ACR4il is 
moderated, but remains statistically positive (coefficient 2.43***, H0: ACR4 il + ACR4 il * IPO il = 0 
rejected at 1%). Alternatively, looking at the marginal effects, a one standard deviation increase 
in the concentration ratio increases the probability of collateral incidence by 8.51% for pre-IPO 
loans, while for post-IPO loans this effect is reduced to 4.15%. Hence, the contribution of 
concentrated markets in facilitating the extraction of information rents, or preventing informational 
spill-over to competitors, is greatly eroded, since more information about borrowing firms has 
been disseminated due to the equity IPO. This more equal distribution of information further 
reduces de novo banks’ adverse selection problems and lowers barriers to entry, which is 
another reason why informational rent extraction is more difficult for post-IPO loans. This result 
confirms Hypothesis H.4 (Section 2.1.3).  
We find that the positive impact of market concentration on collateral is both statistically 
and economically significant even for post-IPO loans. The presence of a certain degree of 
informational asymmetry existing among lenders even post-IPO could explain this result. At the 
same time, it also could lend some support to the view that information asymmetries are not the 
only channel that may lead to higher collateral incidence in concentrated markets. The “market 
power channel”, which we discussed in Section 1, suggests that monopolistic or oligopolistic 
banks can extract rents by using their market power, increasing collateral requirements even in 
environments where all lenders are equally informed. This channel could be particularly important 
for banking markets characterized by geographic restrictions in branch expansion or restrictions 
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in business scope. Furthermore, given that our sample is composed of large listed firms whose 
funding needs might not be served by smaller banks, large banks can enjoy their market power 
further, even when borrower information is equally distributed among inside and outside lenders.   
It is likely that firms gain bargaining power vis-à-vis lenders after their IPO, for example 
because the listing will improve their access to capital markets or increase their attractiveness as 
client for other lenders. This would reduce the positive impact of relationship lending or bank 
market structure on collateral incidence. Nevertheless, at least part of the bargaining power gain 
is due to the higher visibility of post-IPO information dissemination, which makes it extremely 
hard to differentiate informational effects from power/bargaining effects.24 We control for possible 
shifts in borrowing firms’ bargaining power by introducing the interaction term Numlender il * IPO il. 
It is expected that firms that can borrow from more different lenders may benefit from higher 
competition between inside and outside banks, therefore having more bargaining power vis-à-
vis their current lender(s) (Yasuda, 2007). In our univariate tests, we found that an average firm 
borrows from two banks before the IPO, while this number increases to four after the IPO, 
suggesting increasing bargaining power. However, the coefficients on Numlenderil and 
Numlender il * IPO il are both insignificant.  
Next, we briefly discuss the results for the other control variables. First il is significantly 
positive for pre-IPO loans, indicating that borrowing for the first time from a certain lender before 
the IPO is associated with a higher likelihood of collateral pledging. For post-IPO loans, collateral 
incidence is not affected by whether the loan is the first one from a certain lender or not (H0: First il 
+ First il * IPO il = 0 cannot be rejected). This pattern is fairly persistent throughout all our regressions, 
which further supports the role of equity IPOs in disseminating information. Before an IPO, the first 
loan is associated with a higher collateral incidence due to limited knowledge of the borrower. 
However, this significant relationship disappears after the IPO, given that the IPO process and post-
IPO information disclosure increase the transparency of the borrowing firm to all potential lenders. 
Switching lenders (Switch il), however, does not affect collateral incidence before or after the IPO. 
The coefficients of other control variables are similar to those reported in Table III, and are available 
upon request.   
To conclude, using equity IPOs as an informational shock, the results in this section 
provide evidence of informational rent extraction, whether the informational advantage is driven 
by relationship lending or concentrated markets. As discussed in Section 1, the results of this 
section are subject to caveats related to alternative explanations and endogeneity issues of key 
variables, which we examine in Section 4 and 5.  
Table IV: Identify informational rents through IPOs  
This table reports estimates based on various versions of Equation (3). Column (1) to Column (3) 
add the interaction terms Sizeconcenil*IPOil and ACR4il*IPOil progressively. Column (4) excludes 
the potentially endogenous contract terms Spread and Maturity and re-estimates Column (3). 
M.E. are marginal effects based on Column (3). For variables interacting with IPOil, we report 
marginal effects of said variable from before and after the IPO. Results for control variables and 
fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                                          
24. Pagano et al., (1998) suggest it is impossible to distinguish information and bargaining power effects related to IPOs. 
Saunders and Steffen (2011) investigate the bargaining power effect of IPOs through information effects.  
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) M.E. 
Sizeconcen 0.493** 0.169** 0.596*** 0.604*** 4.78 
 (0.215) (0.069) (0.218) (0.218)  
ACR4 2.806*** 5.617*** 5.935*** 5.931*** 8.51 
 (0.807) (1.201) (1.216) (1.211)  
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.369  -0.471** -0.463** 1.17 
 (0.226)  (0.229) (0.228)  
ACR4*IPO  -3.218*** -3.503*** -3.574*** 4.15 
  (1.000) (1.016) (1.012)  
First 0.423** 0.203 0.478** 0.462** 10.78 
 (0.194) (0.143) (0.195) (0.195)  
First*IPO -0.430** -0.190 -0.485** -0.454** -0.19 
 (0.201) (0.144) (0.203) (0.203)  
Switch 0.177 0.153 0.175 0.133 4.14 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)  
Switch*IPO -0.218* -0.189 -0.215 -0.207 -1.06 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)  
Numlender -0.000 -0.023 0.009 -0.002 0.78 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)  
Numlender*IPO 0.025 0.051* 0.016 0.021 2.34 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)  
IPO -0.132 1.396** 1.914*** 1.951*** -7.13 
 (0.206) (0.572) (0.627) (0.626)  
Constant -1.063 -2.417 -2.936 -3.025  
 (1.886) (1.946) (1.964) (1.959)  
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank  
Other loan contract terms Yes Yes Yes No  
Controls variables firm characteristics, monetary  
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,753  
Pseudo R2 0.288 0.289 0.289 0.285  
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.124*  0.124* 0.141**  
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0  2.399*** 2.431*** 2.357***  
H0:First+First*IPO=0 -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.008  
H0:Switch+Switch*IPO=0 -0.041 -0.036 -0.039 -0.074*  
 
3.2.4 DO INFORMATIONAL RENTS VARY WITH FIRM RISK? 
Finally, we test whether after the IPO informational rents are reduced for safe firms, but not, or 
to a lesser extent, for risky firms. We introduce the three-way interaction terms between our 
informational rent variables (Sizeconcen il or ACR4 il ), IPO il and the firm risk proxy Multiapp il. 
Results are reported in Table V.  
In the first column, we examine the main effect of Multiapp il. A firm with multiple 
applications is 7% more likely to pledge collateral than first-time approved firms, which is 
consistent with our belief that being rejected for a stock exchange listing is associated with higher 
firm risk. Three-way interaction terms are introduced in Column (2). Our results show that the 
marginal effects of the informational rent variables (Sizeconcen il and ACR4 il) on collateral are all 
positive both before and after IPOs. However, whether these marginal effects are moderated 
after the IPO depends on the riskiness of the firms. To see this, we calculate the changes in the 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1616 
marginal effects of the informational rent variables before and after IPOs, for both safe (Multiapp il = 0) 
and risky firms (Multiapp il = 1). For safe firms, the marginal effect of Sizeconcen il on collateral drops 
by 4% after the IPO, while for risky firms it increases by 3.2%. Similar results are found for market 
structure. The marginal effect of ACR4il declines by 6% for safe firms after the IPO, but for risky 
firms it increases by 5.5%.  
These results show that the ability of inside banks to charge informational rents after the 
IPO declines for safer firms, but increases for risky ones. This is because once the borrower is 
identified as safe, outside banks bid aggressively for lending business, reducing the inside bank’s 
monopoly power. In contrast, outside banks will be less interested in lending to risky firms when 
the latter poorer creditworthiness is revealed, strengthening the ability of inside banks to extract 
rents. We test the robustness of these results by removing loan contract terms (Column (3)) and 
monetary policy and regional macroeconomic variables (Column (4)). Our results remain the 
same.  
Table V: Informational rents and firm risk 
This table investigates how informational rents vary with firm risk. Firm risk is proxied by a dummy 
variable Multiapp that equals one if the firm applied multiple times before eventually being listed, 
and zero if being listed in its first IPO application. Column (1) tests the main effect of Multiapp. 
Column (2) introduces three-way interaction terms among informational rent variables 
(Sizeconcen and ACR4), listing status (IPO) and Multiapp. For these two columns, other control 
variables are the same as in Table III (Column (1)). Column (3) and (4) removes progressively loan 
contract terms and monetary and regional macroeconomic variables. Results of control variables 
and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 0.600*** 0.634*** 0.648*** 0.646*** 
 (0.219) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
ACR4 5.979*** 6.073*** 6.081*** 5.741*** 
 (1.217) (1.254) (1.249) (1.226) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.476** -0.532** -0.526** -0.526** 
 (0.229) (0.236) (0.235) (0.235) 
ACR4*IPO -3.558*** -4.368*** -4.441*** -4.419*** 
 (1.016) (1.060) (1.055) (1.054) 
Multiapp 0.286*** 0.730 0.925 0.820 
 (0.094) (2.131) (2.093) (2.098) 
Sizeconcen*Multiapp  -0.462 -0.497 -0.510 
  (0.471) (0.465) (0.465) 
ACR4*Multiapp  -1.493 -1.856 -1.647 
  (3.676) (3.608) (3.617) 
Multiapp*IPO  -4.872** -4.873** -4.791** 
  (2.364) (2.327) (2.331) 
Sizeconcen*Multiapp*IPO  0.944* 0.959* 0.974* 
  (0.552) (0.546) (0.546) 
ACR4*Multapp*IPO  9.315** 9.305** 9.143** 
  (4.085) (4.019) (4.026) 
IPO 1.962*** 2.347*** 2.384*** 2.379*** 
 (0.627) (0.650) (0.647) (0.647) 
Constant -2.854 -2.794 -2.904 -0.632 
 (1.963) (1.972) (1.967) (0.925) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Other loan contract terms Yes Yes No No 
Monetary policy variables Yes Yes Yes No 
Regional macro variables Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,753 8,753 
Pseudo R2 0.290 0.293 0.289 0.289 
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4 Alternative explanations 
As noted earlier, the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO 
loans could be explained by alternative theories, which we investigate in this section.25 One 
possible alternative explanation is that credit quality is significantly higher for listed firms 
compared to non-listed ones. In other words, it is higher credit quality instead of lower information 
asymmetries that explains this moderated effect. The second possible explanation of this effect 
is related to the specific selection by banks of their prospective customers. The final alternative 
explanation that we explore is that relationship banks reduce their collateral requirements in 
exchange for corporate bond underwriting business. We do not find supporting evidence for the 
first two alternative explanations, while the last alternative explanation cannot dismiss the 
informational rent extraction hypothesis.  
4.1 Higher credit quality of listed firms 
Both Boot (2000) and Longhofer and Santos (2000) (see Section 1) predict a weaker positive 
correlation between relationship lending and collateral incidence for financially sound firms 
relative to distressed firms. If listed firms are financially healthier than non-listed ones, it would 
reduce the need to post collateral from the relationship lender’s perspective, as the risk of 
financial distress and the likelihood of engaging in future rescue is lowered. However, various 
studies have shown that the operating performance of listed Chinese firms deteriorates markedly 
after their IPO. For example, Allen et al. (2014) compare the operating performance of listed and 
non-listed firms in China for the years around the IPO and find that the average return on assets 
of the former drops significantly from 0.12 to 0.07 within a [-3, 3] years window. This sudden 
drop is not observed for the non-listed firms over the same time horizon. These authors attribute 
the deterioration of performance to the extremely strict listing requirements of the CSRC,26 which 
induce firms to improve earnings in the years prior to the IPO in order to meet these requirements, 
adjusting operations to generate short-term profits at the cost of sacrificing long-term growth. 
Similar evidence is also found in our sample where the average return on assets before the IPO 
is around 10% higher than after (e.g. from 15% prior to the IPO to 5% after, see Table II).  
To further address selection bias due to the listing status caused by observables, we 
employ propensity score matching. The propensity score of loans obtained by listed firms is 
estimated based on a set of variables determining the IPO. Using nearest neighbor matching, 
loans granted to listed firms are then matched to the ones granted to non-listed firms. We drop 
loans that are outside of the common support to minimize the potential bias they may introduce. 
This process generates a matched sample of loans that are “identical” in every aspect, expect 
for the borrower’s listing status. We re-estimate the baseline model in Table IV, Column (3), on 
this matched sample. Our results do not materially change (available upon request). We conclude 
that the higher observed credit quality of listed firms is unlikely to drive our results. 
                                                                          
25. We can discard rather straightforward one alternative explanation of the positive correlation between collateral incidence 
and relationship lending intensity that we find. This is the “cost minimization incentive” view (Menkhoff et al., 2006), which 
we discussed in Section 1. This interpretation is not able to explain our results, as this incentive is unlikely to change 
depending on whether the borrower is listed or unlisted. Hence, the observed significant and negative coefficient of the 
interaction term Sizeconcen il * IPO il is not supported by this theory. 
26. To be approved for listing, firms need to report positive earnings in the three consecutive years prior to the IPO or have 
accumulated at least RMB 30 million in net income. In addition, firms are required to have accumulated net cash flows of 
more than RMB 50 billion or revenues in excess of RMB 300 million in the three years prior to the IPO. 
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Obviously, the credit quality of listed and non-listed firms may also differ in an 
immeasurable way. We conduct further analysis in Section 5 to account for these unobserved 
risk factors.     
4.2 Selection effect 
Suppose the “relationship dependent” listed firms that obtained loans are on average safer than 
“relationship dependent” non-listed firms, while the “relationship non-dependent” listed firms that 
obtained loans are on average riskier than “relationship non-dependent” non-listed firms. This 
selection effect could explain the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence 
that we find for post-IPO loans. To address this concern, we perform difference-in-difference 
tests for observed risk proxies broken down by whether a firm is relationship dependent and 
whether the loan is borrowed after the IPO. In a fashion similar to Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010), 
a relationship dependency dummy is defined to equal one if Sizeconcen is above or equal to the 
sample median (0.20). We construct difference-in-difference tests for the key financial risk proxies 
(ROA, Leverage, Tangibility, Liquidity, Size, Maturity, Spread and Loansize). For each of these 
variables, we compute the mean values broken down by relationship dependency and listing 
status. We then calculate for each firm type (“relationship dependent or not”) the mean difference 
between the listed and non-listed samples, and investigate whether the difference between these 
two means is significant. This procedure is equivalent to estimating a linear regression for each 
of the firm risk proxies on IPO il, the relationship dependency dummy and the interaction terms 
of these two variables. The coefficient of the interaction term and its statistical significance 
indicate whether relationship dependent and non-dependent firms differ significantly depending 
on their listing status. Results are reported in Table IA.I. In all these difference-in-difference tests, 
the interaction terms are statistically insignificant except for Liquidity. Hence, the selection effect 
is unlikely to be the key driver of our results.  
Finally, we conduct matched sample analysis within pre- and post-IPO samples and 
compare the impact of relationship lending on collateral pledging across samples. This way we 
remove the possibility that firm-risk dynamics around the IPO could be driving our results. If 
relationship banks extract informational rents and if IPOs reduce information asymmetries among 
lenders, the average treatment effect of relationship lending should be positive for pre-IPO loans 
and be moderated or insignificant for post-IPO loans. We find that relationship dependent firms 
are on average 10% to 12% more likely to pledge collateral relative to matched non-dependent 
firms for pre-IPO loans, while the difference between these two groups vanishes for post-IPO 
loans. Technical details, estimation results and sensitivity tests (including balancing property of 
covariates and sensitivity to unobservables) are reported in the Internet Appendix, Section A and 
Tables IA.II-III. 
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4.3 Corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending  
Banks may exchange better loan conditions for corporate bond underwriting business.27 As most 
firms have their bond IPO after the equity IPO, and many firms choose their relationship banks 
as underwriters, the moderated effect of relationship lending for post-IPO loans could be the 
result of exchanging better loan conditions for bond underwriting fees, instead of an informational 
equalization effect. Our sample includes 1,287 loans that were originated after the firms’ bond 
IPOs, which is a sizeable sample that could drive our results. To address this issue, we construct 
various samples that only incorporate loans granted before the firms’ bond IPOs. If our results 
are driven by concurrent lending and corporate bond underwriting, once we exclude loans 
borrowed after the bond IPO, the significant results for the interaction term Sizeconcen il * IPO il should 
vanish. We find that this is not the case. Results are reported in the Internet Appendix, Table 
IA.IV.  
 
                                                                          
27. For instance, Yasuda (2007) documents that firms in Japan obtain a fee discount when employing relationship banks as 
corporate bond underwriters.  
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5 Endogeneity of IPO and relationship lending 
In the previous sections, we have treated the IPO and relationship lending as exogenous 
variables. As discussed in Section 1, they could be endogenous due to unobserved risk factors. 
We apply recursive bivariate Probit models to address the endogeneity issue of IPOs in Section 
5.1 and of relationship lending in Section 5.2. Our results are robust after controlling for these 
endogeneity issues.  
5.1 Endogeneity of IPOs 
The fact that all firms in our sample eventually conducted an IPO alleviates the endogeneity 
concern of IPOs to some extent. However, selection bias could still be present due to unobserved 
factors. As discussed in Section 1, the exact timing of an IPO is to a large extent unpredictable 
for firms, but it is possible that there exists an uncontrolled factor which may affect both the 
timing of the IPO and the pledging of collateral. For instance, firms’ political connections 
(unobserved to the econometrician) can speed up the listing process and at the same time lower 
collateral requirements, as banks may consider politically connected firms less risky. This omitted 
variable problem makes the IPO variable and subsequently its interaction terms with other 
covariates in Equation (3) correlated with the error terms, leading to biased estimates. To address 
this issue, we follow Wooldridge (2010) and implement a recursive bivariate Probit model with 
instrumental variables.28 The model is estimated with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). 
Besides consistency and efficiency of MLE, a crucial benefit of this approach is that we can easily 
estimate the interactions of binary endogenous variables with exogenous variables in the 
structural equation (Wooldridge, 2010).29 One simply needs to specify that the only source of 
endogeneity results from the binary treatment variable, treating the interaction terms in the 
structural equation as if they were exogenous. Specifically, we estimate the following model:  
ܥ݋݈݈ܽݐ݁ݎ݈ܽ = 1ሾܼଵߙଵ + ܫܱܲ ଵܺߚଵ + ߝଵሿ > 0 
ܫܱܲ = 1ሾܼଶߛ + ߝଶሿ > 0	                                                                [4] 
where ܼଵ is a vector of collateral determinants and ଵܺ contains unity and variables that 
are allowed to be interacted with ܫܱܲ. This Collateral Equation is the same as Equation (3). In the 
IPO Equation, ܼଶ contains all variables in ܼଵ and at least one additional instrumental variable, i.e. 
it contains some exogenous variable that affects the listing status, but does not explain collateral 
incidence except through a firm’s listing status.30 The error terms are assumed to be bivariate 
normal distributed with correlation ߩ, i.e. ߝଵ, ߝଶ~∅(0, 0, 1, 1, ߩ).  
We derive our instrumental variables from IPO suspensions announced by the CSRC. 
By the end of 2013, the CSRC had suspended the IPO reviewing and approval process 
                                                                          
28. Since IPO is a binary variable, traditional two-stage least squares models will produce inconsistent estimators (Green, 
2008). 
29. The existence of endogenous interaction terms in the structural equation causes no problem for MLE estimations of the 
bivariate Probit model, because the density function of the outcome variable is conditional on all exogenous variables and 
the endogenous binary variable (or is a function of the endogenous binary variable); therefore, the conditional density function 
is the same whether or not the endogenous binary variable (or function of the endogenous binary variable) enters the 
structural equation. 
30. Wilde (2000) shows that the exclusion restriction is not generally needed in multi-equation Probit systems and that 
identification is achieved if varying exogenous regressors appear in both equations of the bivarate Probit model. Wooldridge 
(2010), however, recommends not to rely on nonlinearities solely to identify the parameters in these models.  
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unexpectedly eight times.31 These suspensions were unforeseeable for both banks and 
borrowers, and therefore can serve as exogenous shocks. During these suspension periods, no 
new IPOs were approved, while IPO applications that already had started were put on hold. 
These suspensions affected the listing status for at least two reasons: first, listings were delayed 
as the amount of reviewing work for the CSRC to complete simply piled up; and second, some 
applicants needed to renew their application documents, as the ones used initially had expired 
because of the IPO suspension. This process involved significant costs and at times was even 
not feasible for firms that exhausted their resources to (artificially) improve their accounting 
performance.  
Naturally, it is unrealistic to assume that IPO applications were affected by all past CSRC 
suspensions: only the suspensions that occurred during a firm’s preparation period should have 
affected its IPO. The actual dates when firms started their preparation process is unknown, but 
the preparation and completion of an IPO usually takes at least one to three years. We take the 
middle value of two years prior to the actual listing date as our cut-off point.32 Our first instrument 
is a dummy variable, Affected_Firms, which equals one if firms experienced at least one IPO 
suspension during the two-year window prior to their actual listing. 442 firms (or 68% of all firms) 
satisfied this condition; in total, these firms obtained 6,351 loans (or 68% of all loans) throughout 
our sample period. We further calculate the number of IPO suspension days within this 2-year 
window as our second instrument, denoted it as dd_lag2. The average number of suspension 
days for Affected_Firms are 258 days. For unaffected firms, the number of suspension days is 
zero. To address skewness, we use log(1+dd_lag2) in the estimation.  
The results of the recursive bivariate Probit model are reported in Table VI. For 
comparison purposes, Column (1) reproduces the baseline model of Table IV, Column (3). 
Columns (2) and (3) show the estimates of the recursive bivariate Probit model using 
Affected_Firms and log (1 + dd_lag2) as instruments, respectively. For the purpose of brevity we 
report the key results only. Regarding the instrumental variables in the IPO Equation, we find that 
the coefficients of Affected_Firms and log (1 + dd_lag2) are negative and statistically significant 
at 1%, consistent with our expectation that IPO suspensions affected the listing status. More 
importantly, after controlling for the endogeneity of IPOs, the coefficients of the key variables in 
the structural equation (Collateral Equation) are very similar to the single Probit estimation results 
in Column (1). This result should not come as a surprise, since the MLE estimates of the 
correlation coefficient ߩ are statistically insignificant in both Column (2) and (3), indicating that the 
exogeneity assumption of IPOs cannot be rejected, which further validates our estimations in the 
previous sections using a single equation Probit model.  
Obviously, the validity of instruments hinges on the assumption that the CSRC IPO 
suspensions did not influence collateral incidence directly. Unfortunately, this assumption is not 
testable. An informal test of the exclusion restriction can be derived by including instrumental 
variables in the structural equation and test if their coefficients are statistically significant. The 
coefficients of log (1 + dd_lag2) and Affected_Firms are -0.009 (p-value 0.22) and -0.03 (p-value 
0.53), both of which are statistically insignificant. Another caveat is that banks may consider the 
IPO suspensions as negative shocks to the firms involved. Consequently, banks may raise 
collateral requirements for loans obtained during the suspension periods. This could relate IPO 
suspensions directly to the incidence of collateral, and therefore violate the exclusion restriction. 
                                                                          
31. By the end of 2013, the CSRC IPO suspension periods were: 1) 1994/7/21-1994/12/7; 2) 1995/1/19-1995/6/9; 3) 
1995/7/5-1996/1/3; 4) 2001/7/31-2001/11/2; 5) 2004/8/26-2005/1/23; 6) 2005/5/25-2006/6/2; 7) 2008/9/16-2009/7/10; 
8) 2012/11/16-2013/12/31.   
32. Defining a 3-year window does not materially change our results. Results are available upon request.  
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To test this, we define a dummy variable Affected_Loans which equals one if loans are obtained 
by Affected_Firms during the suspension periods and zero otherwise. We find that 1,410 loans 
(or 15% of our sample) satisfy this condition. We re-estimate the baseline model (Table IV, 
Column (3)) including the Affected_Loans dummy. If banks consider the IPO suspensions as 
negative shocks to firms, Affected_Loans should be significantly positive. The coefficient of 
Affected_Loans is indeed positive (0.04, with p-value 0.48), but statistically insignificant.33 
To conclude, the test results are consistent with our view that collateral incidence is 
independent from the IPO suspensions ordered by the CSRC, and log(1+dd_lag2) and 
Affected_Firms are valid instruments. Furthermore, our main results hold after controlling for the 
endogeneity of IPOs.  
5.2 Endogeneity of relationship lending 
Relationship lending may also be endogenous due to omitted variables affecting both relationship 
formation and collateral incidence.34 For instance, firms with a bad credit reputation (unobserved 
to the econometrician but known to all competing banks) could only borrow repeatedly from their 
incumbent banks due to limited outside options. Therefore, the positive correlation between 
relationship intensity and collateral incidence may result from unobserved poor credit quality 
instead of informational rent extraction. We employ the recursive bivariate Probit model with 
instrumental variables to address this concern. To implement this approach, first we need to 
transfer the continuous measure of relationship lending into a binary variable. In a fashion similar 
to Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010), a relationship dependency dummy (ܴ݈݁) is defined to equal 
one if the firm obtained at least 20% (sample median of Sizeconcen) of its loans from the lender 
prior to the current loan and zero otherwise. Second, at least one exclusion restriction must be 
provided: at least one exogenous variable should exist that determines ܴ݈݁, but which does not 
affect collateral incidence except through relationship intensity. We create a lagged regional 
average lending rate (Localavrate) as such an instrument (definition and summary statistics are 
reported in Table I). A similar approach has been applied in Bharath et al. (2011).35 Localavrate is 
expected to affect relationship lending positively, as firms might prefer to borrow from their 
relationship lenders if conditions in regional (local) credit markets had been tight before. It is 
unlikely that past regional average lending rates would affect the collateral pledged for current 
individual loans.36  
Similar to Equation (4), the recursive bivariate Probit model is defined by a two-equation 
system: a Collateral Equation and a Relationship Equation, where the relationship dependency 
dummy ܴ݈݁ and its interaction term with IPO (ܴ݈݁ ∗ ܫܱܲ) enter the Collateral Equation. Other 
covariates in the Collateral Equation correspond to the ones used in Table IV, Column (3). The 
model is identified once the exclusion restriction Localavrate is added to the Relationship 
                                                                          
33. These tests of the exclusion restriction are not tabulated to save space. Full results are available upon request.  
34. The self-selection issue of borrowing in concentrated or non-concentrated banking markets is not modeled. This self-
selection issue is unlikely to be relevant, because cross-regional loans are rare, due to the segmentation of Chinese banking 
markets. Regional banks such as city commercial banks and rural commercial (co-operative) banks mainly serve clients 
located in their own region. It is only recently that some city commercial banks have been allowed to establish branches 
outside their home province to better serve local customers. Banks that operate at the national level, such as state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) and joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), have extensive branch networks, which allow their 
local branches to provide loans to local firms. It is unlikely that firms will self-select themselves to borrow from banks 
(branches) outside their home province or in regional markets characterized by specific market structures in order to avoid 
collateral requirements.   
35. Bharath et al. (2011) conducts joint estimations of loan contract terms, employing lagged average lending spreads over 
the last six months as instruments for collateral. These authors suggest that lagged average lending spreads do not 
necessary affect non-price terms such as collateral, based on concrete information obtained from bankers.  
36. Unreported results show that Localavrate is statistically insignificant as a determinant of collateral incidence. Results are 
available upon request.   
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Equation, together with other determinants of relationship lending.37 Results are reported in Table 
VI, Column (4). The estimated correlation between the error terms of the two equations, i.e. ߩ, is 
significantly negative (-0.508***, p-value 0.002), rejecting the exogeneity assumption of 
relationship lending and supporting the recursive bivariate Probit estimation approach. The 
coefficient of the instrumental variable (Localavrate) in the Relationship Equation is 0.115 and 
significant at 1%, indicating that firms in provinces with higher past average lending rates were 
also more likely to borrow from relationship lenders. Turning to the Collateral Equation, the 
estimates controlling for the endogeneity of relationship lending are consistent with the baseline 
results in Column (1).  
Table VI: Bivariate Probit Models 
This table reports the results of recursive Bivariate Probit models with instrumental variables. 
Column (1) replicates the Probit model results of Table IV, column (3) for comparison purposes. 
Column (2) and (3) treat IPO as endogenous variable. Column (4) treats relationship lending 
dummy Rel as endogenous variable, where Rel is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm obtains 
at least 20% (i.e. the sample median of the Sizeconcen) of bank loans from the lender prior to 
the current loan, and 0 otherwise. In all specifications, the variables in the Collateral Equation 
correspond to the ones used in Table IV, column (3), except that in Column (4) where Sizeconcen 
and Sizeconcen*IPO are replaced by Rel and Rel*IPO, respectively. Variables in the IPO Equation 
include one instrument (Affected_Firms or Log (1 + dd_lag2)) and all variables in the Collateral 
Equation, except IPO and its interaction terms with other covariates. Variables in the Relationship 
Equation include one instrument (Localavrate) and all variables in the Collateral Equation, except 
Rel, Rel * IPO, relationship control variables (Relcontrols defined in section 2.1.1), and their 
interactions with IPO. The instrumental variables are defined as following: Affected_Firms is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has experienced at least one CSRC IPO suspension within 
the 2-year window prior to the firm’s actual listing; Log (1 + dd_lag2) is the logarithm of 1 plus 
the number of CSRC IPO suspension days within the 2-year window prior to the firm’s actual 
listing; Localavrate is the regional average lending rate one semi-accounting year before the 
current loan. Full results of Bivariate Probit models are available upon request. Standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Probit  Bivariate probit  
IPO as endogenous 
Bivariate Probit  
Rel as endogenous 
IV: 
Affected_Firms 
IV: 
Log(1+dd_lag2) 
IV:  
Localavrate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Collateral Equation 
Sizeconcen (Rel) 0.596*** 0.589*** 0.589*** 1.314*** 
 (0.218) (0.217) (0.217) (0.247) 
ACR4 5.935*** 5.873*** 5.848*** 4.999*** 
 (1.216) (1.214) (1.214) (1.178) 
Sizeconcen*IPO (Rel*IPO) -0.471** -0.460** -0.460** -0.521*** 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.148) 
ACR4*IPO -3.503*** -3.487*** -3.469*** -3.198*** 
 (1.016) (1.013) (1.012) (0.935) 
IPO Equation 
                                                                          
37. Covariates in the Relationship Equation include firm and loan characteristics, monetary policy and regional 
macroeconomic variables, and fixed effects dummies. Excluding potentially endogenous loan characteristics does not 
change our results. Estimation of the Relationship Equation shows that firms are more likely to borrow from relationship 
lenders if they are located in concentrated markets, are liquid, smaller, more leveraged, less profitable, have better loan 
contract terms such as longer loan maturities and lower spreads, and if the loan represents a relatively large portion of the 
firm’s existing debt (Loanconcen). Full results for the recursive bivariate Probit model are available upon request. 
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Affected_Firms  -0.681***   
  (0.094)   
Log(1+dd_lag2)   -0.080***  
   (0.016)  
Relationship Equation 
Localavrate    0.115*** 
    (0.040) 
ߩ  -0.129 (p=0.12) -0.114 (p=0.17) -
0.508***(p=0.002) 
Observations 8741 8,765 8,765 8765 
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6 Further robustness tests 
This section presents further robustness tests accounting for unobserved firm specific time-
invariant risks with the fixed effects Logit model (6.1); the endogeneity of other loan contract 
terms using the instrumental (IV) Probit model (6.2); and the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
samples (6.3). Our main results are robust to all these tests. 
6.1 Firm fixed effects  
Including firm fixed effects alleviates the concern that unobserved time-invariant risk factors can 
drive our results. As the Probit model is not suitable for fixed effects regressions, we resort to the 
fixed effects Logit model. Table VII reports the full sample results for specifications without 
potentially endogenous loan contract terms (Column (1)) and with those terms (Column (2)). 
Column (3) and (4) replicate these regressions for a sample excluding loans originated after a 
firm’s bond IPO. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the impact of relationship intensity on 
collateral incidence is significantly positive for pre-IPO loans, but statistically insignificant across 
all specifications for post-IPO loans (H0: Sizeconcen il + Sizeconcen il * IPO il = 0 cannot be rejected). 
This result is even stronger than that of our baseline model (Column (3) of Table IV), supporting 
the hypothesis that IPOs as informational shocks eliminate rent extraction opportunities. The 
results for market concentration are similar to our previous findings, i.e. more concentrated 
markets increase the likelihood of collateral incidence and this effect is stronger for pre-IPO loans.    
Table VII: Firm fixed effects 
This table reports the results for the fixed effects Logit model for alternative samples, and for 
specifications with and without loan contract terms. Results for firm characteristics and fixed 
effects dummies are not reported to save space. Monetary policy variables and regional macro 
variables are not included in this estimation. Including them does not change our results. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Fixed effects Logit model 
 All loans Loans originated before corporate 
bond IPOs 
 Without loan 
contract terms 
With loan 
contract terms 
Without loan 
contract terms 
With loan 
contract terms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 1.645*** 1.634*** 1.750*** 1.713*** 
 (0.543) (0.544) (0.542) (0.543) 
ACR4 23.247*** 24.007*** 23.356*** 24.055*** 
 (5.305) (5.284) (5.337) (5.309) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -1.472*** -1.453** -1.774*** -1.722*** 
 (0.564) (0.565) (0.567) (0.568) 
ACR4*IPO -17.824*** -18.051*** -19.251*** -19.548*** 
 (5.210) (5.177) (5.209) (5.169) 
First 1.074*** 1.080*** 1.292*** 1.287*** 
 (0.389) (0.388) (0.397) (0.395) 
First*IPO -1.209*** -1.199*** -1.547*** -1.527*** 
 (0.400) (0.399) (0.410) (0.408) 
Switch 0.407 0.448 0.325 0.374 
 (0.300) (0.299) (0.303) (0.302) 
Switch*IPO -0.472 -0.476 -0.365 -0.368 
 (0.311) (0.310) (0.316) (0.315) 
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Numlender 0.023 0.033 0.063** 0.075** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
IPO 10.171*** 10.272*** 10.954*** 11.097*** 
 (2.978) (2.959) (2.978) (2.954) 
Observations 5,856 5,851 4,816 4,811 
Number of firms 291 291 255 255 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.144 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.173 0.181 -0.024 -0.009 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 5.423*** 5.967*** 4.105* 4.506* 
 
6.2 Endogeneity of loan contract terms 
In this subsection, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit regressions to address the 
endogeneity issue of loan contract terms. We examine two possibilities: exclude Spread from 
the determinants of collateral and treat Maturity as the sole endogenous variable; and treat both 
Spread and Maturity as endogenous variables.38 The instruments chosen for Maturity are asset 
maturity (Amaturity, see Barclay et al., 1995) and term spread (Termspread, see Dennis et al., 
2000; Brick and Ravid, 1985). Regarding the lending spread (Spread), we use as instruments 
the benchmark loan spread (Benchsprd, defined as the benchmark lending rate minus the 
benchmark deposit rate) and the lagged regional average lending rate (Localavrate). Benchsprd 
and Localavrate should be correlated with the actual lending spread, but they are not likely to be 
related to whether or not a particular loan is collateralized.39 Summary statistics and definitions 
of these instrumental variables are in Panel F of Table I. Technical details, results and relevance 
and validity of instrumental variables are reported in the Internet Appendix, Section B and Table 
IA.V. We find that loan contract terms are indeed endogenous as the null hypotheses that 
Maturity alone or Maturity and Spread together are exogenous are strongly rejected (Wald-test 
p-value=0.0192 and 0.0000, respectively). Nevertheless, the IV Probit results are largely 
consistent with our previous findings, except that Sizeconcen il loses its explanatory power for 
post-IPO loans (H0:  Sizeconcen il + Sizeconcen il * IPO il = 0 cannot be rejected, p-value = 0.99 
or 0.86 depending on specifications), which is an even stronger result than the one obtained in 
our baseline model. Results for market structure are also similar to our previous findings.  
6.3 Alternative samples   
Lastly, we investigate in this section if the results for our baseline model are sensitive to alternative 
samples. First, we focus on a sample of firms that borrowed at least once before the equity IPO 
and at least once after, which allows us to compare more precisely changes in collateral 
incidence around the actual moment of the IPO. Second, we restrict the sample to loans that 
were originated right before and after the IPO (e.g. one loan before and one loan after); four loans 
closest to the IPO date (e.g. two before and two after); and six loans closest to the IPO date (e.g. 
three before and three after). These short event windows minimize the possibility that significant 
events other than IPOs may affect our results. Results for these samples are reported in the 
Internet Appendix, Table IA.VI. Finally, we investigate if our results are driven by loans that were 
                                                                          
38. The existing literature differs in treating which of the loan contract terms should be endogenous in determining collateral. 
Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) consider Maturity as the only endogenous contract term that affects collateral 
incidence. The underlining assumption is that the lending spread is determined after the decision on collateral pledging. On 
the other hand, Brick and Paila (2007) and Ono and Uesugi (2009) model the spread as an endogenous determinant of 
collateral. As empirical validations are provided for both assumptions and theoretical advantages of either assumption are 
unknown a priori, we examine both. 
39. Benchsprd and Localavrate may reflect changes in the monetary policy stance or business cycle, which in turn might 
affect the incidence of collateral (see Jimenez et al., 2006). If this were true, these variables cannot serve as valid instruments. 
However, our estimations show that monetary conditions measured by the reserve requirement ratio or 7-day repo rate, or 
the business cycle measured by regional GDP growth rates, do not affect collateral incidence significantly, as reported in 
most of our tables. 
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granted on non-commercial terms, for example because of political connections. We re-estimate 
Equation (3) by removing progressively loans from policy banks, state-owned banks, trust and 
investment companies and other financial institutions, under the assumption that loans from 
these institutions could be based on policy preferences, political pressure or other non-standard 
credit criteria. Results are reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA.VII. Our main findings 
remain solid in almost all of these samples.  
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7 Conclusions  
In this paper, we investigate if proprietary information obtained from both lending relationships 
and concentrated markets allows for informational rent extraction through collateral. We find 
that collateral incidence increases with both relationship lending and market concentration, 
and that these effects are less pronounced for transparent firms. Using equity IPOs as 
informational shocks, we find that collateral incidence increases with both relationship intensity 
and market concentration for pre-IPO loans, while these effects are greatly moderated for 
post-IPO loans. Furthermore, we demonstrate that after the IPO, rent extraction through 
collateral is moderated for safe firms but intensified for risky ones, a result in line with the 
prediction of Rajan (1992). Further robustness tests suggest that our results are not caused 
by differences in credit risk, endogeneity of IPOs and relationship lending, concurrent lending 
and underwriting business or loans granted at non-commercial terms. Our results complement 
the findings that banks extract informational rents by charging higher lending rates (Hale and 
Santos, 2009; Schenone, 2009), and in part validate the theoretical predictions that 
concentrated market structures facilitate the accumulation of inside information (Dell’Ariccia et 
al., 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001). Finally, we provide the first loan-level analysis of collateral 
incidence for China, which has received little attention so far.  
Our study opens up a few avenues for future research. A cross-country investigation on 
rent extraction through collateral could be fruitful. Rent extraction through collateral could be 
more likely to occur in less developed markets where banks lack sufficient tools to price credit 
risks in comparison to more advanced markets. Another interesting question is whether banks 
choose different methods to charge rents (either through lending rates or collateral) depending 
on the degree of price regulation or the stance of monetary policy. A third avenue is to investigate 
how rent extraction through collateral could vary with the legal and institutional environment, as 
these aspects crucially determine how valuable collateral is to banks. We leave these for future 
research.  
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Appendix 
This appendix provides technical details and results of the propensity score matching analysis 
(Section 4.2) and the instrumental variable Probit model (Section 6.2). Results of propensity score 
matching analysis are reported in Table IA.II and Table IA.III. Results controlling for endogeneity 
of loan contract terms are reported in Table IA.V. Moreover, details and results are reported of 
several additional tests discussed in Section 4.2 (“difference-in-difference” tests, Table IA.I.) and 
Section 4.3 (corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending, Table IA.IV), and for alternative 
samples such as conducted in Section 6.3 (Table IA.VI-VII).  
A.  Propensity score matching 
This section presents the technical details of propensity score matching (e.g. Heckman et al., 
1998). We divide our sample into two subsamples: pre-IPO loans and post-IPO loans, with the 
former presumably subjected to a higher degree of information asymmetries for non-relationship 
banks. Within each subsample, we estimate the propensity score of loans borrowed from 
relationship lenders using a Logit model. Specifically, for each sample, we regress the relationship 
dummy on the following covariates: ACR4, FT, Liquidity, Size, Leverage, ROA, Age and 
Tangibility.40 For the sake of robustness, we further expand the covariates list by introducing their 
square terms.41 Relationship dummies equal one if Sizeconcen is greater or equal to the sample 
median of the respective samples (0.25 for the pre-IPO sample and 0.19 for the post-IPO sample, 
respectively). Then we match each relationship loan (treatment group) with a (set) of non-
relationship loans (control group) that have the closest propensity scores to that specific 
relationship loan. The average treatment effects of relationship intensity on collateral incidence 
are expected to be significantly positive for the pre-IPO loans, and moderated or insignificant for 
the post-IPO loans.  
To compute the average treatment effects, two alternative matching methods are used, 
i.e. “nearest neighbor” matching and “kernel” matching. We drop all loans that are outside of the 
common support to minimize the potential bias introduced by these loans. Bootstrap standard 
errors based on 50 replications are reported.  
Next, we test the balancing property of covariates. The estimated average treatment 
effects are biased if the covariates determining participation in the treatment group are not 
sufficiently balanced. The standardized bias of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is a common 
statistic to test the balance of the distribution of the covariates in both the control and treatment 
groups. For brevity, we only report the mean bias of the matched sample.42 Several other overall 
balancing tests including the pseudo-R2, Rubin’s B and Rubin’s R are also reported. All of these 
diagnoses confirm that the covariates of the matched sample are balanced. In more detail: the 
mean bias for the matched sample is below the 5% threshold; the pseudo-R2 for the matched 
sample is fairly low; Rubin’s B is below 25 thresholds for most of the cases, and Rubin’s R is 
within [0.5, 2].43 Results are reported in the Internet Appendix Table IA.II.  
                                                                          
40. Estimates on propensity scores are available upon request. 
41. The main purpose of propensity score estimation is not to predict selection into treatment as good as possible, but to 
balance all covariates (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2000). 
42. The standardized biases of individual covariates are available upon request.  
43. Sianesi (2004) suggests that a low pseudo-R2 for the post matching sample is an indicator of balanced matching. Rubin’s 
B is the absolute standardized difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and matched 
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Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results to unobserved variables that affect both 
relationship lending and collateral incidence. Rosenbaum (2002) developed a bounding 
approach to address whether or not inference about treatment effects may be affected by 
unobserved factors. We focus on pre-IPO loans, because as noted by Hujer et al. (2004), 
sensitivity analysis for insignificant treatment effects is not meaningful. Results are reported in 
Internet Appendix Table IA.III. Taking into account that the estimated treatment effect is positive 
for pre-IPO loans, the lower bounds (Q_mh-) – under the assumption that the true treatment 
effect has been underestimated – are less interesting (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Therefore, 
we focus on the upper bounds (Q_mh+). We report the Rosenbaum bounds for propensity score 
model II with the nearest neighbor matching (NN(20)). The results for the bounds are similar for 
propensity score model I and other matching methods. The critical level eγ, at which one would 
question the positive effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence, is 1.85, a fairly large 
value by normal standards (see e.g. Bharath et al., 2011, for further discussion). Note that a 
critical value of 1.85 does not mean that relationship lending has no effect on collateral incidence 
and that unobserved heterogeneity exists. It only states that the confidence interval for the 
treatment effect would include zero if unobserved variables caused the odds ratio of relationship 
lending to differ between relationship borrowers and non-relationship borrowers by a factor 1.85. 
We conclude that it is unlikely that our causal inference of the positive effect of relationship lending 
on collateral incidence for pre-IPO loans could be challenged by powerful unobserved variables.      
 
 
  
                                                                          
sample. Rubin’s R is the ratio of treated to matched variances of the propensity score index. Rubin (2001) recommends that 
Rubin’s B is less than 25 and Rubin’s R lies between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be sufficiently balanced. 
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B. Endogeneity of loan contract terms: IV Probit model 
This section addresses the endogeneity issue of loan contract terms using IV Probit estimations. 
Our choices of instruments are guided by the existing literature and the specific characteristics 
of Chinese banking regulation. For Maturity, we follow Barclay et al. (1995) and employ asset 
maturity (Amaturity) as instrument, as firms may match their debt maturity with that of their assets 
to mitigate agency costs.44 In addition, as proposed in Dennis et al. (2000) and Brick and Ravid 
(1985), loan maturity is expected to be positively related to the slope of the yield curve, proxied 
by the term spread (Termspread). This spread is defined as the yield difference between the 5- 
and 1-year government bonds for the month when the loan was originated. Regarding the 
lending spread, we use as instrument the benchmark loan spread (Benchsprd) for maturities that 
correspond with that of loan l in the month of the loan origination (Benchsprd = benchmark 
lending rate minus the benchmark deposit rate). Another instrument we introduce is the lagged 
regional average lending rate (Localavrate), measured at one semi-accounting year before the 
current loan. Benchsprd and Localavrate should be correlated with the actual lending spread, 
but they are not likely to be related to whether a particular loan is collateralized or not. Summary 
statistics and definitions of these instrumental variables are in Panel F of Table I.  
Results of the IV Probit model are reported in Internet Appendix, Table IA.V. Column (1) 
excludes Spread from the determinants of collateral and treats Maturity as the sole endogenous 
variable, whereas Column (2) treats both Spread and Maturity as endogenous variables.45 
Newey’s efficient two-step estimator is employed to obtain coefficient estimates for both 
specifications. The relevance and validity of our instruments in the IV Probit model are reported 
at the bottom rows.46 In both Column (1) and (2), the null hypotheses that Maturity alone or 
Maturity and Spread together are exogenous are strongly rejected (Wald-test p-value=0.0192 
and 0.0000, respectively), validating the IV Probit approach. The results of the conditional 
likelihood-ratio (CLR) test, K test and Anderson-Rubin Chi square test (AR) all reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are 
(jointly) zero. We also conduct the J statistics test, which assesses the validity of the instruments, 
i.e. the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. In both Column 
(1) and (2), the J statistics are statistically insignificant, confirming the validity of our instruments 
for the endogenous loan contract term Maturity, or for both Maturity and Spread.  
 
  
                                                                          
44. Bharath et al. (2011) and Barclay et al. (2003) provide in-depth discussions of the validity of using asset maturity as an 
instrument for debt maturity. We follow Li et al. (2009) in defining asset maturity. See Table I, Panel F for definitions. Missing 
data for asset maturity is replaced by the industry median. 
45. The existing literature differs in treating which loan contract terms should be endogenous in determining collateral. Dennis 
et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) consider Maturity as the only endogenous contract term that affects collateral. The 
underlining assumption is that the lending spread is determined after the decision on collateral pledging. On the other hand, 
Brick and Paila (2007) and Ono and Uesugi (2009) model the spread as an endogenous determinant of collateral. As 
empirical validations are provided for both assumptions and theoretical advantages of either assumption are unknown a 
priori, we examine both possibilities. 
46. See Finlay and Magnusson (2009) for details on weak instrument robustness tests for limited dependent variable models.  
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Table IA.I Difference-in-Difference  
This table reports the difference-in-difference tests in key risk factors for post- and pre-IPO 
samples (post-IPO-pre-IPO) and for both relationship dependent and non-dependent firms. 
Relationship dependent firms are the ones with Sizeconcen greater or equal to the sample 
median, while the rest are non-dependent firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Mean differences (post-IPO-pre-IPO) 
 ROA Leverage Tangibility Liquidity Size Maturity Spread Loansize 
Relationship 
dependent Firms 
-
0.03*** 
0.21*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 4.04*** 0.14** 0.25** 1.06*** 
Relationship non-
dependent firms 
-
0.05*** 
0.20*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 3.94*** 0.19*** -0.06 0.83*** 
Difference-in-
Differences 
-0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.08*** -0.11 0.04 0.19 -0.23 
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Table IA.II: Selection of observables – Propensity score matching on relationship 
lending.  
This table reports average treatment effects of relationship lending on collateral incidence for pre-
IPO and post-IPO loans. Propensity Score Model I in Panel A employs the following variables: 
ACR4, FT, Liquidity, Size, Leverage, ROA, Age and Tangibility. The Propensity Score Model II in 
Panel B includes all variables used in Panel A and the square terms of these variables (except 
the square term of FT). Logit regression is adopted in both panels. Bootstrap standard errors 
based on 50 replications are reported. NN(20) and NN(50) are the nearest neighbor matching 
estimators with 20 and 50 nearest neighbors. Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.06 is 
applied for the kernel matching estimator. Observations of common support are discarded. All 
balancing tests are based on matched samples. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: Propensity Score Model I 
Pre-IPO loans Post-IPO loans 
 NN(20) NN(50) Kernel NN(20) NN(50) Kernel 
ATE 0.126*** 0.116*** 0.115*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 
Std.Err. (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Mean Bias 4.7 3.2 4.3 3.1 2.5 2.0 
Rubin’s B  17.6 15.0 18.3 10.7 9.5 8.0 
Rubin’s R 0.99 1.16 1.01 1.28 1.46 1.36 
Panel B: Propensity Score Model II 
ATE 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.007 -0.002 0.002 
Std.Err. (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Mean Bias 3.3 4.4 3.3 1.8 1.4 1.9 
Rubin’s B  27.0* 27.4* 20.2 11.0 11.2 9.8 
Rubin’s R 1.16 1.23 1.04 1.42 1.41 1.44 
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Table IA.III: Sensitivity test-Rosenbaum bounds. 
This table reports results for the Rosenbaum bounds test for Propensity Score Model II with 
nearest neighbor matching (NN(20)). eγ is the odds of differential assignment due to unobserved 
factors. Q_mh+ and Q_mh- are the upper and lower bounds of the Mantel-Haenszel statistic. 
With increasing eγ, the bounds move apart, reflecting uncertainty about the test-statistics in the 
presence of hidden bias. p_mh+ and p_mh- are significance levels for upper and lower bounds.  
eγ Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 4.51  4.51  0.00  0.00  
1.05 4.24  4.78  0.00  0.00  
1.1 3.98  5.04  0.00  0.00  
1.15 3.74  5.29  0.00  0.00  
1.2 3.51  5.53  0.00  0.00  
1.25 3.29  5.77  0.00  0.00  
1.3 3.07  6.00  0.00  0.00  
1.35 2.87  6.22  0.00  0.00  
1.4 2.68  6.43  0.00  0.00  
1.45 2.49  6.64  0.01  0.00  
1.5 2.31  6.84  0.01  0.00  
1.55 2.13  7.04  0.02  0.00  
1.6 1.97  7.23  0.02  0.00  
1.65 1.80  7.42  0.04  0.00  
1.7 1.64  7.60  0.05  0.00  
1.75 1.49  7.78  0.07  0.00  
1.8 1.34  7.95  0.09  0.00  
1.85 1.20  8.13  0.12  0.00  
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Table IA.IV: Corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending 
This table reports the results for samples of loans issued before corporate bond IPOs using the 
Probit model. Column (1) reports results for the full sample. Column (2) report results for a sample 
of firms that borrowed both before and after their equity IPOs. In both columns, loans borrowed 
after corporate bond IPOs are excluded. Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects 
dummies are not reported to save space. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 Loans before corporate bond IPOs 
 All firms Firms that borrowed both before and 
after equity IPO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Sizeconcen 0.642*** 1.531*** 
 (0.190) (0.326) 
ACR4 4.651*** 12.911*** 
 (1.228) (2.637) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.511** -0.813** 
 (0.201) (0.398) 
ACR4*IPO -3.777*** -4.129* 
 (1.022) (2.460) 
First 0.542*** 1.083*** 
 (0.154) (0.252) 
First*IPO -0.562*** -1.079*** 
 (0.160) (0.288) 
Switch 0.106 0.500*** 
 (0.121) (0.188) 
Switch*IPO -0.182 -0.592*** 
 (0.128) (0.222) 
Numlender 0.027*** 0.111*** 
 (0.008) (0.028) 
IPO 2.086*** 3.371** 
 (0.601) (1.425) 
FT -0.631*** -0.731*** 
 (0.052) (0.255) 
Constant -0.341 -7.682 
 (0.920) (182.973) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Monetary policy variables  No No 
Regional macro variables  No No 
Other contract terms No No 
Observations 7,453 1,606 
Pseudo R2 0.270 0.401 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.131* 0.719*** 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 0.875 8.781*** 
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Table IA.V: Endogeneity of loan contract terms. 
This table reports IV Probit regression results, treating other loan contract terms as endogenous 
variables. Column (1) treats Maturity as the sole endogenous variable, assuming that Spread 
does not affect collateral incidence. Column (2) treats both Spread and Maturity as endogenous 
variables. The instruments for Maturity are asset maturity (Amaturity) and term spread (Termsprd). 
Instruments for Spread are the lagged local average lending rate (Localavrate) and benchmark 
loan spread (Benchsprd). Definitions and summary statistics for these instrumental variables are 
reported in Table I, Panel F. Results for fixed effects dummies and first stage estimations of IV 
Probit regression are not reported to save space. They are available upon request. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 IV Probit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Maturıty෣   0.597** 
  (0.273) 
Spread෣  0.996** 0.746*** 
 (0.426) (0.271) 
Sizeconcen 0.503** 0.591** 
 (0.250) (0.242) 
ACR4 4.972*** 5.279*** 
 (1.314) (1.320) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.501** -0.608** 
 (0.251) (0.253) 
ACR4*IPO -3.013*** -3.364*** 
 (1.099) (1.098) 
First 0.394* 0.345 
 (0.217) (0.223) 
First*IPO -0.446** -0.480** 
 (0.225) (0.228) 
Switch 0.530*** 0.358** 
 (0.191) (0.146) 
Switch*IPO -0.392*** -0.368** 
 (0.149) (0.148) 
Numlender 0.076 -0.016 
 (0.049) (0.039) 
Numlender*IPO -0.018 0.021 
 (0.040) (0.037) 
IPO 1.648** 1.920*** 
 (0.684) (0.683) 
FT -0.671*** -0.534*** 
 (0.067) (0.056) 
Liquidity 0.090 -0.242 
 (0.329) (0.201) 
Size -0.260*** -0.172*** 
 (0.038) (0.036) 
Leverage 0.372 0.667*** 
 (0.262) (0.155) 
ROA -1.460*** -1.077*** 
 (0.335) (0.351) 
Age -0.452*** -0.521*** 
 (0.071) (0.064) 
Tangibility -0.587** -0.788*** 
 (0.284) (0.222) 
Loansize -0.200*** -0.107*** 
 (0.060) (0.024) 
Loanconcen 1.471*** 1.665*** 
 (0.523) (0.475) 
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RRR -3.191 -0.083 
 (3.273) (3.755) 
Repo 0.045 0.068** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
CPI -1.791 -1.389 
 (1.949) (1.839) 
NPLratio 0.891 -0.905 
 (1.309) (1.382) 
Realgdpindex -1.625 -0.290 
 (1.858) (1.647) 
Constant 0.385 -2.186 
 (2.193) (2.468) 
Observations 8,159 8,159 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.002 (p=0.99) -0.017 (p=0.86) 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 1.959**(p=0.03) 1.914** (p=0.03) 
H0:First+First*IPO=0 -0.052 (p=0.46) -0.136 (p=0.14) 
H0:Switch+Switch*IPO=0 0.138 (p=0.21) -0.009 (p=0.86) 
Wald test (p-value) Chi2(1)=5.48 (0.0192) Chi2(2)=20.36 (0.0000) 
CLR (p-value) 6.12 (0.0146) 23.94 (0.0000) 
K (p-value) Chi2(1)=6.12 (0.0134) Chi2(2)=23.23 (0.0000) 
J (p-value) Chi2(1)=0.00 (0.9488) Chi2(2)=1.81 (0.4041) 
AR (p-value) Chi2(2)=6.12 (0.0469) Chi2(4)=25.04 (0.0000) 
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Table IA.VI: Alternative samples – Firms which borrowed both before and after IPO. 
This table reports the results for a sample of firms that borrowed both before and after their equity 
IPOs. Panel A reports results for all loans. Panel B further restricts this sample to loans around 
IPO dates. Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save 
space. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Firms borrowed both before and after IPO 
 Panel A: All loans Panel B: Loans around IPOs dates 
  One loan 
before and one 
after equity 
IPO 
Two loans 
before and two 
after equity 
IPO 
Three loans 
before and 
three after 
equity IPO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 1.532*** 2.293** 1.099** 1.173*** 
 (0.324) (0.921) (0.534) (0.441) 
ACR4 12.211*** 14.652 11.515** 7.357* 
 (2.543) (9.731) (5.416) (4.284) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.713* -1.108 -1.165* -1.076* 
 (0.394) (1.208) (0.683) (0.552) 
ACR4*IPO -4.224* -0.766 -8.850* -8.722** 
 (2.405) (8.008) (4.901) (4.031) 
First 1.121*** 2.497*** 1.439*** 0.854** 
 (0.251) (0.842) (0.499) (0.378) 
First*IPO -1.069*** -1.086 -1.351** -0.860* 
 (0.286) (0.873) (0.564) (0.447) 
Switch 0.491*** -0.815 -0.049 0.277 
 (0.188) (0.623) (0.381) (0.283) 
Switch*IPO -0.588*** -0.138 -0.423 -0.465 
 (0.220) (0.831) (0.494) (0.376) 
Numlender 0.114*** 0.367** 0.176** 0.131** 
 (0.027) (0.158) (0.084) (0.058) 
IPO 3.353** 1.439 6.374** 6.165*** 
 (1.394) (4.649) (2.837) (2.332) 
FT -0.683*** -5.019*** -2.392*** -1.880*** 
 (0.244) (1.291) (0.555) (0.410) 
Constant -7.514 -14.636 -12.967 -8.227 
 (159.820) (326.925) (326.330) (242.200) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry FE, Province FE, Bank Type FE, Time FE 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No 
Monetary policy variables No No No No 
Regional macro variables No No No No 
Other loan contract terms No No No No 
Observations 1,663 215 421 564 
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.553 0.452 0.364 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.819*** 1.184 -0.066 0.096 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 7.987*** 13.886 2.665 -1.365 
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Table IA.VII: Alternative samples – Excluding non-commercially viable loans. 
This table reports results for samples of loans provided by different types of banks. We exclude 
progressively loans that are less likely to be issued on a commercial basis. The model 
specification is based on Equation (4) excluding: Maturity, Spread, monetary variables and 
regional macroeconomic variables. Including these variables does not affect our results. Column 
(1) excludes loans borrowed from state-owned banks (SOCBS). Column (2) excludes loans from 
policy banks (PBs). Column (3) excludes loans from both policy banks and state-owned banks. 
Column (4) further excludes loans borrowed from trust and investment companies (TICs). Column 
(5) further excludes loans from other financial companies (Other), which leaves loans from joint-
stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial (cooperative) banks and 
foreign banks remaining. Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not 
reported to save space. The equation is estimated with the Probit model. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Excluding 
SOCBs 
Excluding 
PBs 
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs 
&TICs 
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs 
&TICs&Other 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sizeconcen 1.323*** 0.556*** 0.792** 0.958** 0.957** 
 (0.344) (0.194) (0.368) (0.388) (0.393) 
ACR4 11.231*** 5.047*** 10.203*** 9.115*** 9.108*** 
 (1.972) (1.212) (2.076) (2.173) (2.195) 
IPO*Sizeconcen -1.229*** -0.409** -0.680* -0.722* -0.706* 
 (0.358) (0.203) (0.385) (0.406) (0.412) 
IPO*ACR4 -7.334*** -3.153*** -6.541*** -4.875*** -5.358*** 
 (1.718) (1.022) (1.779) (1.871) (1.881) 
First 0.703*** 0.501*** 0.528** 0.682*** 0.616** 
 (0.227) (0.157) (0.246) (0.257) (0.262) 
IPO*First -0.673*** -0.474*** -0.446* -0.605** -0.550** 
 (0.234) (0.162) (0.254) (0.264) (0.269) 
Switch 0.316* 0.030 0.070 0.077 0.110 
 (0.190) (0.123) (0.207) (0.217) (0.221) 
IPO*Switch -0.444** -0.126 -0.263 -0.277 -0.308 
 (0.200) (0.129) (0.217) (0.227) (0.231) 
Numlender 0.024** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.027** 0.028** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
IPO 4.511*** 1.731*** 3.773*** 2.811** 3.039*** 
 (1.017) (0.604) (1.065) (1.120) (1.127) 
FT -0.520*** -0.565*** -0.440*** -0.477*** -0.476*** 
 (0.070) (0.048) (0.075) (0.083) (0.084) 
Constant -9.580 -0.111 -8.429 -8.433 -6.706 
 (165.908) (0.917) (95.904) (92.578) (80.646) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No No 
Monetary policy variables No No No No No 
Regional macro variables No No No No No 
Other loan contract terms No No No No No 
Observations 4,098 8,273 3,573 3,274 3,132 
Pseudo R2 0.313 0.286 0.317 0.322 0.312 
H0: ACR4+IPO*ACR4=0 3.897*** 1.894** 3.662*** 4.239*** 3.750*** 
H0:Sizeconcen+IPO*Sizeconcen=0 0.094 0.147* 0.112 0.238* 0.251* 
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